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ABSTRACT 
The current Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan has multiple funding sources. The 
importance of the opium production and smuggling has been touted as essential to the 
continuation of the Taliban insurgency in today’s media. This thesis aims to understand 
the true value of the opium trade to the Taliban and to explore alternative revenues 
sources for the Taliban both inside and from outside of Afghanistan and whether the 
opium trade is essential to sustain the current level of activity by the insurgency. The 
problem that the coalition faces is not as one-dimensional as is portrayed in the media 
when it comes to financially crippling the Taliban insurgency. It is also important to 
break down the complex situation the population in Afghanistan faces and how this 
contributes to the growth of the opium production. Understanding the tribal, agricultural 
and governmental factors helps to determine the true nature of the opium trade. Media 
sources often equate the Taliban and the essential link to the opium trade, coercion of the 
populous and opium revenue as critical factors for the success of the Taliban. The 
Taliban have had a mixed history in their tolerance of opium production and poppy 
cultivation. During their control of 95 percent of Afghanistan from 1996 through 2001, 
they moved from tolerating poppy cultivation to imposing a complete ban. After the 
coalition invasion and the Taliban resurgence as an insurgency they have encouraged 
poppy cultivation in the areas they exert control over. However, the revenue from the 
opium is not the only revenue source, and the other revenue sources are quite significant 
and surprising. In addition the history of Afghanistan is rife with examples of the nature 
of funding for warfare, which need to be understood as a cultural norm. Ultimately this 
thesis aims to demonstrate that the focus of coalition efforts to interdict opium trafficking 
should not be their main focus, rather only the successful training and implementation of 
local competent security forces will affect the funding revenue from both narcotics and 
the myriad of other illicit sources. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
We need to redouble our efforts to combat the financial support networks 
of al Qaeda and the Taliban. A financially weakened al Qaeda is less 
capable of sending fighters into Afghanistan, training operatives to strike 
American and allied interests overseas, and organizing to attack us here at 
home. Likewise, a financially weakened Taliban will be a less capable 
fighting force, more vulnerable to ISAF military maneuvers, and less able 
to threaten the stability of the Afghan government.1 
A. PREFACE – WHY DOES MONEY MATTER 
Since the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in September 2001, the narcotics 
industry has boomed, fuel largely by the lack of governmental control of the country and 
the desires of the insurgents, warlords and a population simply trying to survive.2 As the 
opium industry emerged during the struggle against the Taliban, NATO and the media 
were quick to link the rise in opium production to the funding of the Taliban as an 
essential part of the success of the insurgency. On example is Gretchen Peters in her 
book, Seeds of Terror written in 2009, “the insurgency is exploding precisely because the 
opium trade is booming,” however, she goes on to show that the Taliban force the 
population to grow set quotas, making the poppy cultivation not just tolerated but forced, 
critically linking the opium revenues to the successes of the Taliban.3 It was about this 
time the U.S. government began to look more deeply into the idea the opium trade in 
Afghanistan was not the critical sole revenue source for the Taliban, rather one piece of a 
complex financing network.  
There has been a recent shift in opinion both in the U.S. government and media 
towards the realization the insurgency was not wholly dependant on the narco-trafficking 
profits. The main problem I have identified is the efforts to financially disrupt the 
insurgency have been focused on disruption of the narco-trafficking. An example of the 
                                                 
1 David S. Cohen, "Treasury Official on Terrorist Finance in Afghanistan, Pakistan" (Washington 
D.C.: U.S. Department of the Treasury, January 28, 2010). 
2 UNODC, UNODC predicts stable opium crop in Afghanistan , February 10, 2010, 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2010/February/unodc-predicts-stable-opium-crop-in-
afghanistan.html (accessed February 10, 2010). 
3 Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 2009), 4–6. 
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linking of U.S. policy to defeat the Taliban and interdicting the nacro-trafficking is seen 
in news articles as recent as 2010, and the following example is discussing the aftermath 
of the successful capture of a key node in the Taliban narcotics trade in central Helmand 
province, “The hope now is for the United States to persuade the locals to change their 
crops from poppies—grown to produce opium for the Taliban's drug trade—and instead 
grow crops like wheat, which can help them survive and provide income as well.”4 Even 
this overt message for the desire of the West to persuade the population of Afghanistan to 
curtail a lucrative means of supporting their families may be ill-informed as the Taliban 
have also developed revenues from licit crops, and easily so given the lack of security.  
If success is measured by the amount of persons killed (or not) on the battlefield, 
than the U.S. must focus on interdicting the revenue sources and criminal networks that 
feed the insurgency by providing funds, materiel, and opportunities for the Taliban to 
continue the fight. Ultimately, without abundant funding the Taliban will falter and be 
forced to relinquish sovereignty to the Afghan government.  
B. PURPOSE 
It has been nine years since Operation Enduring Freedom began and the situation 
for the troops on the ground is worse than any other year. The amount of insurgent 
attacks has increased year over year, and now the amount of coalition troops is at an all 
time high for Afghanistan. For the U.S. the war is estimated to cost $8.6 billion per 
month, or $102.8 billion per year, or $282 million per day, all based on the current level 
of 98,000 U.S. troops.5 These figures are tied almost exactly to the troop levels in 
Afghanistan; for every 1,000 troops the cost is roughly $1 billion per year. Estimates of 
the insurgent funding puts their yearly financing at the maximum of $1 billion and as low 
as $400 million. The exact number of insurgent fighters is impossible to know, and does 
fluctuate throughout the year, however, there are some estimates from coalition forces of 
                                                 
4 Matiullah Mati, Afghan president visits city at center of anti-Taliban push, March 7, 2010, 
http://articles.cnn.com/2010–03–07/world/afghanistan.main_1_baghlan-province-taliban-afghan-
government?_s=PM:WORLD (accessed March 7, 2010). 
5 Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 
9/11, Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service (Washington D.C.: CRS, 2010). 
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25,000 to 36,000 active fighters.6 Comparisons of the effort of the insurgency to the 
efforts of the U.S. portion of the coalition lead to a few questions.  
This thesis answers the following questions. How will interdicting the narco-
trafficking affect the ability of the insurgency? If the narcotics trade is truly vital to the 
insurgency then it must provide a significant portion of the revenue. This leads to the next 
question; is the insurgency capable of sustainment without opium revenues? Without the 
most publically touted revenue source, will the insurgency have to adapt or sue for 
peace? In order to get the answer to these questions, the ultimate question becomes; what 
is the monetary requirement of the insurgency, and can it even be disrupted to a point of 
effectiveness? Should the narcotics trade be disrupted within Afghanistan, in this author’s 
opinion, best done at the farm-gate level, the next issue is the collateral impact. Thus an 
important question arises when being mindful of the complexities of starving the 
insurgency of funding while maintaining the livelihoods of the Afghan farmers; how will 
certain anti-criminal efforts influence our efforts in relation to the peaceful population of 
Afghanistan?   
C. IMPORTANCE 
Multiple works have studied the origins of the Taliban and their rise to dominance 
in Afghanistan through the 1990s. Equally so numerous works have detailed the 
relationship of the Taliban and the opium trade during their time as the Afghan regime as 
well as their apparent ideological shift from non tolerance to accepting the opium 
industry in order to reconstitute themselves after their defeat in 2001. While this is indeed 
important, what has been not fully uncovered is the full extent to which the insurgency in 
Afghanistan relies on alternative revenue sources, which after some analysis is potentially 
a larger revenue stream than opium. This of course does not mean the insurgency would 
want to abandon opium proceeds, nor the networks the opium traffickers provide access 
to, which is important for moving illicit goods, both in out of Afghanistan. Richard 
Barrett is quoted as stating, “They are involved on a local level in anything that makes 
                                                 
6  Jerome Starkey, "Major-General Richard Barrons puts Taleban fighter numbers at 36,000," The 
Times, March 3, 2010. 
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money,” he said. “They don’t choose drugs over something else. They just choose what is 
there.”7 This study does not attempt to cover the genealogy of the insurgency nor the 
dynamics of the criminal networks operating within Afghanistan, the focus remains the 
quantifying of revenue and identifying possible coalition and Afghan security force 
strategies to remove the funding from underneath the insurgency and (consequently) 
criminal networks.  
This thesis is aimed at understanding a critical resource, money, without which 
the insurgency would begin to lose cohesion and effectiveness. Ultimately the goal of the 
United States and its NATO partners in Afghanistan is to successfully defeat the Taliban, 
support the local government by ensuring effective security and governance in all parts of 
Afghanistan, and be able to withdraw the bulk of the military forces present there within 
the politically allotted timeframes.  
The U.S. authorities need to make the interdiction of funding to the insurgency a 
high priority in order to affect the ability of the insurgency to continue. Historically, the 
United States has been less than enthusiastic to support efforts in Afghanistan, beginning 
after World War Two. Only when the impact of Soviet expansion presented itself did the 
United States decide to increase its involvement in Afghan affairs. Immediately after the 
United States’ policy objectives were achieved against the Soviets in the 1980s, the 
United States once again had little interest in Afghanistan.8 Only through protracted 
direct engagement in Afghanistan has the United States come to realize the necessity of 
understanding the cultural norms and regional dynamics that make this a difficult part of 
the world to operate in from a Western perspective.  
The telling factor of the success of the insurgency will be the state of Afghanistan 
at the end of the publically stated withdrawal date of 2014, by which time the Afghan 
security forces are expected to prevent the resurgence of the Taliban. The power of the 
insurgency will be determine by its continued ability to muster forces and resources, 
                                                 
7  Catherine Collins and Ashraf Ali, Financing the Taliban, April 19, 2010, 
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/financing_the_taliban#_ednref2 (accessed September 22, 
2010). 
8  Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2010), 276. 
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primarily funding from the multiple sources identified in this paper. The opium 
production in Afghanistan is not inevitable and can be supplanted with licit crops. The 
Taliban demonstrated this themselves when they banned poppy cultivation from July 
2000 until October 2001. The prevention of poppy cultivation is not impossible, rather 
will require a capable state security apparatus and significant state aid to break farmers 
out of the debt cycle associated with poppy cultivation. The U.S. must also play a part in 
assisting the plight of the Afghan farmers. The encouragement of the opium production in 
order to stave off Soviet expansionism planted the seeds for the current situation and thus 
the U.S. cannot simply wash its hands of the current social difficulties of crop transition, 
and to some part resisting the will of oppressive forces.  
D. PRIMARY THESIS ARGUMENT 
The ultimate objective of the thesis is to emphasize the insurgency will be 
successful no matter where or how the Taliban receive funding. Desire from Western 
countries to curtail the narcotic industry is an obvious start and the success of anti-
narcotic campaigns within Afghanistan will be viewed favorably outside of the country. 
Within Afghanistan, these campaigns will lead to increased hardships on the population 
and make little to no impact on the success of the insurgency, already seen to be highly 
adaptive to changing battlefield environments.  
The success of curtailing the diverse funding sources for the insurgency will 
ultimately be measured by the success of the Afghan security institutions, and their 
ability to enforce the sovereignty of the central Afghan government. In addition, global 
pressures on food prices could be a saving grace for Afghan farmers looking for viable 
alternatives to opium cultivation. However, the ever-cyclic nature of prices for goods will 
keep the potential for opium production within Afghanistan.  
E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
A historical approach looking at the genesis of the opium trade in southern 
Afghanistan is the approach for Chapter II of this paper. In order to understand the 
pervasive narcotics conundrum that exists in Afghanistan it is important to understand the 
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role the U.S. played in its development and why the U.S. must now persist in its 
commitment to assisting the state security apparatus’ to regain their legitimacy and for 
Afghanistan to be able to exercise its sovereignty.  
This study will attempt to research the extent of the narco-trafficking and its ties 
to the Taliban, the amount of revenue garnered from such activity, and the impact of this 
activity on the population of Afghanistan. Most critically is quantifying the opium 
proceeds the Taliban enjoys, and comparing those proceeds to the estimated revenue the 
insurgency receives from other activities. Formal studies by the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) will provide much of the data for this section of the study, as 
the UNODC has consistent reporting yearly since the mid 1990s. In addition media 
sources and scholarly articles concerning the attitudes of the population will be used to 
gauge the impact of supplanting opium crops for other licit crops. U.S. government 
agencies and independent institutions have also provided detailed reports on the situation 
in Afghanistan, and most refer to the opium trade, although fewer refer directly to the 
alternative sources of insurgent funding.  
The second goal of this study will attempt to compile and quantifying the amount 
of revenue alternative funding benefits the Taliban, and the potential of such revenue to 
make up for any reduction from opium, should counter-narcotics efforts begin to make an 
effect. Media sources, since 2008, have begun to look more directly at alternative 
revenues for the insurgency in Afghanistan, and these reports from within Afghanistan, 
when compiled, offer a comprehensive look at the complexities of the insurgency and the 
dynamic and diverse funding it enjoys. Much of the data for this section of the study is 
compiled largely from media sources and thus must be extrapolated to assess the true 
value of such activities to the insurgency. The quantifying of revenue for both opium 
cultivation and alternative revenues is attempted to bring in a recent data as possible to 
get the best picture possible. As with any study done in recent history, significant events 
can change the outcome of the study immediately and significantly after completion. For 
this study such an example would be the eradication of poppy cultivation through disease, 
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thus completely ending the opium revenue to the Taliban, something the Western states 
would not shed a tear over, indeed may have contemplated.9 
The conclusion will attempt to assess the number of insurgent fighters operating 
in Afghanistan, and put a price tag on the overall cost to the insurgency as to manpower, 
weapons and equipment. All of this is to be done to the most current information 
available. The insurgency, although not monolithic in its structure and cohesion, will not 
be broken up by region; however, where certain activities are prevalent, the indications 
are that the insurgent group operating in that area will benefit from these proceeds as 
opposed to the entire insurgency. A good example would be the opium production in the 
south, where the Quetta Shura Taliban is the dominant insurgent force.  
F. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis is an attempt to bring the diverse sources and methodologies of the 
insurgency funding in Afghanistan into one complete volume. In order to evaluate the 
impact of Western nation efforts to curtail funding to the insurgency, it is first necessary 
to look at exactly from where the money comes from, what is needed, and how impacts 
can be made upon the finances of the insurgency.  
Chapter II will cover the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan since 1945. This 
chapter aims to bring an historical context to the genesis of the opium state in 
Afghanistan. The overall disinterest of the U.S. toward Afghanistan during the Cold-war 
period allowed to conditions for the future opium state to mature. During the early years 
of the Cold-war the U.S. consciously avoided large financial support to the Afghan state 
fostering failed revitalization projects and planted the seeds of discontent toward the U.S. 
by the Afghan population. Also the U.S. decided Afghanistan was outside of the 
necessary states needed to thwart the expansion of the Soviet Union, thus driving 
Afghanistan to seek military and commercial support from the Soviet Union, allowing the 
Soviet Union to infiltrate and foster communist ideology amount parties there. Ultimately 
the U.S. chose to fight a proxy war using the Mujahedeen against the Soviet invasion, 
                                                 
9  James Robbins, West funds anti-opium fungus, October 1, 2000, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/951082.stm (accessed September 21, 2010). 
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encouraging the opium trade in order to allow the anti-Soviet militants to fund their 
operations. After the Soviet Union withdrew and the Cold War ended, the U.S. again 
looked at Afghanistan as nothing more than a unimportant sideshow. The emphasis of 
this chapter is to show, at numerous times during the second half of the twentieth century, 
the U.S. could have fostered a stronger and more involved relationship, curtailing the 
Soviet influence, and addressing the humanitarian difficulties the country was facing 
before the scourge of opium production became deep rooted into the necessity of Afghan 
population survival.  
Chapter III looks specifically at the opium production in Afghanistan and what it 
means to Afghanistan’s population and insurgency. For the first few years after the 2001 
invasion of Afghanistan the focus of funding to the insurgency was synonymous with the 
illicit poppy cultivation and opium trafficking. It is important to look at the extent of the 
opium exports, most importantly at the farm-gate level, basically at the lowest level, 
where interdiction and alternatives will affect the entire opium network. Also estimates of 
the funds the insurgents receive from the opium production need to be assessed to 
understand the impact of the denial of those funds directly derived from opium 
production and smuggling.  
Chapter IV will attempt to address the myriad of alternative revenue sources 
available to the insurgency throughout Afghanistan. This is a less explored area of 
funding importance to the insurgency, and significantly more diverse. Racketeering, 
protection fees, taxes, tolls, ransoms, extortion, underground businesses, remittances, 
donations, foreign state assistance, bribery, kickbacks, zakat, ushr, foreign state support 
and other sources of funding feed the insurgency. The diverse nature of the non-drug 
funding needs to be explored to assess the extent and estimate the financial gains from 
such activities. Some sources of non-drug financing prove to regional, or tied to specific 
industries within Afghanistan and can be evaluated to a degree of certainty of what the 
likely proceeds to the insurgency will be in the future. In addition to understanding the 
comprehensive list of revenue sources the insurgency enjoys, this chapter will also look 
at the hawala system and the facilitation this informal banking system brings to the 
insurgency, plus the difficulties of interdiction upon this network.  
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Chapter V offers conclusions and identifies the way forward for the government 
of Afghanistan and the coalition forces fighting there. The size of the insurgency and 
assessment of the funding necessary to the insurgency is estimated. By understanding the 
financial needs of the insurgency, the value of attacking funding sources can be put into 
the context of worthiness. Analyzing the revenues from both the narcotics industry and 
the alternative sources, there can be a determination of the impact of focusing efforts 
toward anti-narcotics or focusing efforts in other areas. Also important is the assessment 
of the actions of the insurgency to adapt its methods of funding should the illicit narcotics 
funding be taken away. The necessity of the Afghan government to increase its ability to 
enforce its authority over the entire country is vital to any effort undertaken and must be 
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II. U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN SINCE 1945 – 
GENESIS OF THE OPIUM STATE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Driving throughout the Helmand River valley today, one might get the impression 
that the poppy fields of Afghanistan have existed for centuries. The population is adept at 
cultivating, harvesting and processing the opium gum that eventually becomes refined 
heroin. What is surprising is that this phenomenon has only become as widespread as it 
appears in the last 35 years, only two generations in Afghanistan having grown up with 
poppy as their cash crop. How and why did such a socially destructive crop become a 
mainstay of so many Afghan farmers?  
Despite heroin being seen today as a major epidemic in the world, and against 
which the U.S. is constantly battling, heroin in the south Asian region has been almost 
exclusively self-contained and a minor problem for the population, for hundreds of years. 
In 1504, traders talked of the drugs present in Kabul as the caravans travelled through the 
region.10 At the end of the colonial era in 1947, the Kingdom of Afghanistan and 
Pakistan were minor opium producers with small addict populations, according to a 
British source, “but not to any great extent.”11 
This chapter explores the United States’ role in the formation of the Afghan 
opium industry from the end of World War Two until the 1980s, when the Afghan opium 
trade exploded into epidemic proportions. Throughout the twentieth century there had 
been little U.S. interest in Afghanistan until the Soviet invasion in 1979 and the 
subsequent Taliban takeover in the mid 1990s. With the Post 9/11 conflict highlighting 
the epic proportions of the Afghan opium production, particularly in southern provinces, 
it is important to understand the genesis of the agriculture in this region.  
I will first look at the 1940s through the 1970s, and the U.S. involvement in 
Afghanistan, or lack thereof, exploring how the U.S. may have created the very beast it 
                                                 
10 Martin Ewans, Afghanistan, A New History (London, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2002), 19. 
11 Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin (Chicago, IL: Lawrence Hill Books, 2003), 468. 
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now knows not how to tame. Then I will look at the 1980s and 1990s, and how the 
Afghans were able to reap the failures of U.S. involvement prior to the Soviet invasion to 
create a narco-state rivaled by none.  
B. U.S. INTEREST IN AFGHANISTAN 1940s, 1950s, 1960s AND 1970s 
In 1919, following the third Anglo-Afghan conflict, Afghanistan gained 
autonomy over it’s foreign affairs, Tajik Mohammad Wali Khan travelled to the U.S. for 
the first official visit.12 Little came out of this initial visit and would be an indicator for 
the next 60 years of U.S. interest in Afghanistan. In 1934, a State Department note went 
out to President Roosevelt suggesting that it might be well “to strengthen the political and 
economic relations, which Afghanistan had and still has with the high government of the 
United States”. What exactly the relations were, are unclear and little happened in regard 
to this note. Not until 1936, did the U.S. ambassador to Iran travel to Afghanistan and 
obtain a friendship treaty.13 From 1935 until 1948, Afghanistan had a U.S. Minister 
Plenipotentiary instead of an official ambassador as it was deemed not important enough. 
In 1948, a formal U.S. embassy is established in Kabul with Ely E. Palmer the first 
official ambassador.14 
At the end of the colonial period, when Great Britain gave up it’s dominant role in 
interests in south Asia, the Cold War was beginning to expand outside of the European 
theater. The colonial empires were being divided up among spheres of influence of the 
superpowers of the Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.) and the United States of America (U.S.). 
During this time Afghanistan had found itself in a neutral position, landlocked with little 
resources or strategic interests to fight over.  
1. The Helmand River Valley Project 
From the 1930s, Afghanistan had desired to regain economic strength and hired 
outside assistance to do such. In the 1930s, the Japanese started the Helmand River 
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project, however, their efforts were limited to managing teams of Afghan workers with 
little mechanization involved. The Helmand river project was a desire to reconstitute the 
massive irrigation system along the length of the Helmand river from the base of the 
Hindu Kush mountains to the border with Iran.15 It was during the riegn of the Mongols 
the existing irrigation systems had beeen destroyed and little had been done to reconstruct 
since 1506.16 The reengineering of the Helmand river would also have consequences on 
Afghan-Iranian relations later on, as the Helmand river is one of the few rivers in the 
world that does not drain to the ocean, rather ends in marshes in the Iranian desert west of 
Afghanistan.17 
In 1946, Afghanistan approached an American civil engineering company, 
Morrison-Knudsen (MKA), who negotiated $17 million private project to regulate the 
Helmand and Arghandab rivers, with dams, canals, irrigation and 450km of roads.18 The 
idea was to settle the nomad populations of southern Afghanistan who had been forced to 
live that way since the Mongols destroyed their pastulaist livelihood.  
Although MKA negotiated the project privately, Afghnistan could not pay for 
rising costs and the U.S. Import-Export Bank was approached for loan of $118 million. 
Of that request only $21 million was given in 1949, to much resentment in Kabul.19 
There were complications through relying on and not understanding the Afghan workers 
and too much logistics (U.S. to Afghanistan) drove up costs, the Afghan government was 
not able to undertake all the projects it desired due to the small U.S. loan.20 By 1949, the 
projects were behind schedule, and only by 1951, the Arghandab and 1953, the Kajaki 
dams being completed. The Kajaki dam was one of the world’s first failed dam projects, 
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socially, financially and environmentally.21 MKA did not anticipate difficulties and only 
managed to achieve only 170,000 acres, a third of expected, of irrigation by 1959, when 
their tenure ended.22  
The Afghan government created the Helmand Valley Authority (HVA) to give the 
Morrison-Knudsen company control of all the engineering requirements in 1952. In 
accordance with the Truman doctrine of economic support to poor countries, Point Four 
Program (named after the fourth foreign policy point in his inaugural address) assistance 
was sent to Helmand in 1952, to help get things moving. The International Cooperative 
Administration (future AID) entered in 1953, and attempt to navigate the touchy situation 
trying to re-educate the population on agricultural practices highlighting the fact the old 
Afghan methods of farming do not damage the land as American machines do.23 
However, the U.S. failure to successfully live up to its obligation, although originally a 
private enterprise had already put a stain on America in the heads of the Afghans.24  
During the HVA stage two phase, 1953–1963, MKA indirectly help bring 
working class skills to a large portion of the Afghan population that were unseen before. 
This is an often overlooked benefit of the American engineering firm operating in 
Afghanistan and controlling the project on behalf of the government.25 However, this is 
of little consolation to the thousands of Afghans affected by the failed American 
engineering attempts. Directly though, MKA nor ICA prepared for the task at hand of 
training Afghan technicians to take over the project, machine operators, or 4,000 other 
positions outside local knowhow.26 
What also turned out to be not so helpful was the lack of education for the new 
settlers on the irrigated land. Afghans could not distinguish between the Point Four 
contractors, who were there to ‘advise’, not ‘do’, and the MKA engineers, who were 
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there to ‘do’, not ‘advise’.27 The existing crop yields in the Helmand river basin were 
reduced by approximately half during the 1960s as both new and established farmers 
failed to understand the necessities of water management. Afghans not accustomed to the 
water availability put too much onto the soil and caused the water tables to rise and 
caused soil salinization. Arable land became fallow for years do to this 
mismanagement.28  
In addition the MKA failed to perform initial ground assessment during the 
1940s, at the beginning of the project, which would have determined agricultural 
suitability for much of the land. As settlers began to move onto the land, the soil was not 
supportive of agriculture and by 1967, most of the 1,300 families had left due to poor 
condtions, in greater poverty than before.29 Of those families that were settled was a mix 
of ethnic groups from around Afghanistan, of which some groups did stay in southern 
Afghanistan and are seen in isolated pockets in this region today! 
Henry Byroade, in January 1959, became American Ambassador to Afghanistan. 
He helped to get the loan of a team of United States Bureau of Reclamation technical 
advisors, some from the Columbia River Basin project, which had similar problems to 
those of the Helmand River Valley. In February 1960, an agreement to use the team of 
reclamation personnel was signed between the Afghan and U.S. governments. Through 
1961–1962, many projects went ahead with planning, however, ended up stagnant due to 
American-style bureaucracy, Afghan inward looking society, and lack of decision making 
by all, impeding implementation.30  
In total between 1950 and 1971, the U.S. allocated the HVA $79.2 in grants and 
$59.3 in loans. In addition $10.6 million in grants for agriculture to Afghanistan in 
general. Plus, under PL 480, the U.S. Food Aid Program for countries undergoing 
economic development, $136.8 million in grants and loans in the form of wheat and corn 
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was given to Afghans.31 Where the development of a self-sufficient Afghan agricultural 
sector failed, the U.S. could substitute with imported foodstuffs.  
Why was the HRV so important at this stage in the Afghan-U.S. relations? Four 
fifths of Afghanistan is is desert (a country three times larger then UK) yet four fifths of 
the population makes a living off of agriculture,32 thus the successful agricultural 
development would have signaled honest intent in the well being of Afghanistan. As 
Barnett Rubin noted, farmers were growing multitudes of wheat, cotton and maize. The 
Afghan farmer could make a good profit from his crops and feed his family, earning 
somewhat more then the semi-professionals in the cities.33 Thus by supporting and 
encouraging more agriculture, more of the population would have been better off and 
would have had improved opinions of U.S. projects.   
However, as Griffiths notes later, “The Americans did not feel Afghanistan was 
ready for industrialization, so they confined their aid to the HRV and other agricultural 
products and education and, because of wholly understandable preoccupations elsewhere, 
paid scant and spasmodic attention to Afghhanistan.”34 Less well connected to the HRV 
is the resignation of Shah Mahmud in 1953, U.S. failure to live up to development 
projects, may have played a role in the public opinion against the Shah and ultimately led 
to his downfall.35 
2. Other Aid and U.S. Involvement  
Serious attempts to bring a formal relationship between Afghanistan and the U.S. 
began in 1944, as the first attempt for military aid was sought by Afghanistan.36 The U.S. 
was again approached by Afghanistan for military aid in 1948, with the next attempt 
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occuring during a visit by Shah Mahmud in 1951.37 All these chances were squandered 
opportunities to solidify the entire south Asian region against communist incursions. As 
will be highlighted, these rebuttles forced Afghanistan to turn to the Soviet Union for 
military aid. In the early days, there was still confidence in American altruism, which 
Afghanistan displayed by granting a 75 year concession to the Inland Exploraion 
Company of New York in 1946 for development of the presumed oil deposits.38  
U.S. aid followed Soviet aid in increasing amounts as the turf battle for 
Afghanistan in the Cold War heated up. John Foster Dulles moved into surrounding the 
Soviets during the Truman Doctrine of the early 1950s, and the Afghans had asked for 
American intervention if the Soviets were to move into Afghanistan, however, U.S. gave 
no agreement and the Afghans pragmatically turned to the Soviets for military 
agreements.39 
In addition to Military aid, the Soviets were supporting Afghanistan where the 
U.S. fell short in terms of reconstruction aid. In 1953, Afghanistan made a $36 million 
request for street paving in Kabul and agricultural projects. Regrettably the U.S. Import-
Export Bank only allocated $18 million and the street paving was completed by the 
Soviets, to much appreciation of the regime and population in Kabul. ICA education 
funding and the Qandahar airport from the U.S. helped to smooth relations with more 
ICA funding for the delayed agriculture.40 
In the early 1950s, the U.S. was looking to surround the U.S.S.R. with bomber 
bases, and southern Afghanistan was chosen as a suitable location. In 1956, ground was 
broken at the Qandahar airport, and $15 million dollars later in 1962, an obsolete airfield 
in the modern jet age was completed. A somewhat positive side effect of this defunct 
project resulted in Ariana airlines, the national airline of Afghanistan. The U.S. wanted to 
stifle Russian airlines so fostered Ariana airlines.41 The U.S. had encouraged Pan 
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American to hold a 49 percent stake in Ariana Airlines, in order to stimulate the airline.42 
In addition the U.S. began programs encouraging education, including scholar exchanges 
programs and U.S. universities sponsoring studies at Afghan institutions. In 1952, the 
Afghan School of Agriculture received aid and American staff.43 Also the U.S. State 
Department sent 14 university professors to Afghanistan with good success. Most went to  
the Hababia college in Kabul, some additional went to work in Qandahar.44 
Of course while this goodwill effort was taking place, the U.S. was solidifying its 
international relations attempting to form a ring of U.S. friendly nations willing to stand 
up to Soviet aggression. In 1955, the U.S. organized CENTO (Central Treaty 
Organization), known as the Baghdad Pact involved Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and 
Great Britain.45 John Foster Dulles, the U.S. Secretary of State under President 
Eisenhower formed the ‘Northern Tier states’ where Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey 
were most important to U.S. interests in south Asia.46 The U.S. did not consider 
protection of the Asia sub-continent a priority, already having treaties with the ‘Northern 
Tier states’, to the defense of the Middle East.47 In 1955, at the same time loans to 
Pakistan and Iran were gauranteed by the U.S., just preceding the $100 million loan to 
Afganistan from Russia.48  
The U.S. and its regional allies accepted Afghanistan’s Soviet tilt during the 
monarchy as an unavoidable consequence of its landlocked, vulnerable position.49 The 
Soviets gauranteed the sale of Afghanistan’s fruit crops during the Pashtunistan issues of 
the 1950s. Had the U.S. been on friendlier and more aggressive economic terms, they 
could have influenced the agricultural sector more by curtailing Soviet moves to garner 
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favors.50 In fact a U.S. trade mission concluded that more trade should be encouraged 
with Afghanistan based on favourable conditions of necessity for finished goods within 
Afghanistan.51 On a side note, in 1958 the U.N. praised Afghanistan for banning opium 
cultivation. The U.N. urged support for social and economic programs to assist in the 
opium ban be forthcoming from western nations.52 However, little evidence from this 
time indicates any support took place, another lost opportunity to mitigate the opium 
from Afghanistan.  
During the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. had an awkward position–giving support to 
Pakistan, a much stronger nation the U.S. required as part of its defense strategy–in 
which it could not support Afghanistan, due to the rivalry between it and Pakistan, which 
drove Afghanistan into the hands of the Soviets.53 
President Eisenhower’s visit to Kabul in 1959, signalled improving relations, 
especially as the Soviet attempt to wholly finance the second five year plan was rejected 
by the Afghans, due to the provision of Soviet advisors in all ministries.54 U.S. loans for 
the three five year plans were, $97.3 million (1957–1961), $155 million (1963–1967) and 
$53.1 million (1968–1972).55 The five year plans developed the internal economic 
structures of Afghanistan and were somewhat successful, given the external aid as well.  
In total, all U.S. loans and aid between 1949 and 1973, were $350 million. $166 
million in direct grants, $111 wheat shipments, $100 million spent on the HVA, and in 
1967, $12 million for hydroelectric dam projects, plus $4.6 million for improving 5,000 
acres a year in the Helmand River Valley.56 By the end of the 1960s, Afghanistan had 
received all of its military aid from the Soviet Union and the U.S. was showing signs of 
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complete disinterest in Afghanistan as a whole. What little of an opium trade that existed 
was completely utilized by Iranian addicts and little was seen of this activity in the south 
of the country.  
3. The 1970s 
At the beginning of the 1970s, the U.S. looks to have lost the struggle for 
dominance in  Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, however, this appeared to be of 
little consequence with domestic and economic stability. Formally the U.S. had some 
interests, yet as with many countries at the time they seem to be Cold War rhetoric as 
opposed to actual desires.  
The British always saw Afghanistan as key to its strategy in the southern Asian 
region. In contrast, even at the height of the Cold War the United States never considered 
Afghanistan to be within its politico-strategic definition of “the Free World.” It was 
eventually deemed worthy of major expeditures of U.S. economic assistance (1960s) in 
the competition with the Soviet Union for influence in the ‘Third World.’ But by the 
1970s, in the wake of the debacle of U.S. policy in Vietnam, even this limited interest 
declined.57 
U.S. interests in 1969, were; 1) The preservation of Afghanistan’s independence 
and territorial integrity; 2) The creation of a viable political and economic system, 
responsive through evolutionary change to the needs and desires of the people; 3) The 
prevention of Soviet influence in the country from becoming so strong that Afghanistan 
would lose it’s freedom of action and; 4) The improvement of Afghanistan’s ties with 
Pakistan and Iran.58 All these sound well and good but by 1971 the truth seems to have 
come out, “For the United States, Afghanistan has the present limited direct interest; it is 
not an important trading partner; it is not an access route for U.S. trade with others; it is 
not presently as far as known a source of oil or scarce strategic metals nor does it appear 
likely that it will become so; there are no treaty ties or defense commitments; and 
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Afghanistan does not provide U.S. with significant defense, intelligence or scientific 
facilities.”59 In 1972, the message became even clearer, “Afghanistan was a minor 
element in our policy toward central-south Asia.” As the Soviets in 1975/76, began to 
hold back on aid and supplies to Afghanistan, the U.S. failed to present any counter-
measures and further diminished it’s economic and military commitmants in the area. 
The view at the time was that the Soviets had won the New Great Game.60 The same 
message was repeated until 1978.61 It seems as if Afghanistan became completely 
irrelevant to the strategic posture of the U.S..  The U.S. military reached the conclusion 
that Afghanistan was too distant to be defensible by U.S. action should the Soviets repeat 
their aggression they encouraged in Korea and Vietnam.62 
Even at the the very end of the 1970s, the U.S. still percieved little threat in 
Afghanistan, “Amin had little public backing and the Carter administration did not see 
Afghanistan as one of Soviet expansionism. The U.S. tried to explore the possibility for a 
less contentious relationship with Afghanistan, the country was not a high priority in the 
American thinking. Concern was for Persian Gulf, Afghanistan would come later.”63 
The lack of interest is obvious in a 1978 congressional hearing, where Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Adolf Dubs 
descibes the situation in Afghanistan as follows, “Internally, the political situation in 
Afghanistan is stable. President Daoud remains very much in control and faces no 
significant opposition.”64 America was very much neo-isolationalist post Vietnam, and 
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or should have been sent to Daoud before he was overthrown in 1978, however, there 
was little else the U.S. could have done, given the degree of uninvolvement in 
Afghanistan since the early 1970s.65 
Diversions in the late 1970s played some role in the U.S. disinterest. In 1979, the 
U.S. was preoccupied with events going on in Iran and the Khomeini regime,66 and the 
U.S. ambassador, Adolph Dubs, was killed in 1979 by police attempting his rescue, after 
being kidnapped by Islamists. The U.S. did not deploy any more ambassadors until 2002, 
and cut all aid until a formal apology was issued by the Afghan governement however, 
the Soviet invasion came first and no further aid was received from the U.S. in the 
1970s.67 
Throughout the 1970s, aid dwindled to insignificant amounts due to the Vietnam 
predisposition. Focus ended for the Afghans to develop wheat and corn. Plus a two year 
drought hit Afghanistan in 1971/72 which forced many to move from farming 
altogether.68 This is something the successful Helmand River Valley initiatives could 
have helped alleviate had they been properly funded and managed during the 1950s and 
1960s.  
Not all was doom and gloom for Afghanistan. What development that was 
successful, through aid in the 1960s meant that in the 1970s, Afghanistan exported more 
raisons than California, mostly from Helmand in the southwest, using the United States 
supported HRV irrigation system, which was also to come in useful later when opium 
poppies emerged as the cash crop in this region.69 
To highlight the dearth of aid during the 1970s, U.S. foreign aid to Afghanistan in 
1975 amounted to $15 million! This U.S. neglect coincided with two diametrically 
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opposed political trends in Afghanistan that could have been influenced in a direction 
congenial to U.S. interests by a strong presence and an active policy.70 The U.S. 
assumption that the country had no role in the U.S. Cold War strategy underscores why 
the U.S. chose not to involve itself more in Afghan affairs.  
A potential source of foreign affairs discord not only between Afghanistan and 
two of it’s neighbors, Iran and Pakistan, but also with Western European countries and 
the United States was the smuggling of opium and hashish. There was a presumption of 
government officials’ involvement with the drug trade, however, little was being done to 
address this. It is estimated that only 100 tons of opium, with one author noting the opium 
in the north, was of high quality,71 per year were being produced for regional demand and 
one to two tons of hashish per month were trafficked to Europe and U.S.. Pressure to curb 
this increased in the early 1970s.72 
Until the late 1970s, tribal farmers in the highlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan 
had grown limited quantities of opium and sold it to the merchant caravans bound west 
for Iran and east to India. The south Asian opium market up to that point was self 
contained.73 Iran consumed all of Afghanistans opium production at the time, a total of 
100 tons, feeding the registered heroin addicts the Shah tolerated, despite U.N. 
disapproval.74 Afghanistan’s irrelevance on the global stage was about to be seriously 
upset, and U.S. action and inaction up to the late 1970s in Afghanistan, were about to 
come home to roost.  
C. 1980s – ANTI-SOVIET OR ANTI-OPIUM 
After a severe crackdown by the U.S. in the 1970s against the South American 
drug production and smuggling, the Southeast Asian markets (Laos, Thailand, Burma, 
Vietnam) picked up the slack. The Golden Triangle, as this area was known, was in the 
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mid 1970s, hit by a severe two year drought and increased U.S. interdiction efforts which 
reduced it’s opium production from 700 tons to 160 tons in 1978. Heroin production in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan began to take off with the increased demand. By 1982, central 
Asia produced 1600 tons.75 
Dr. Musto, the Carter administration White House advisor on drugs, in December 
1979, argued that as the arms shipment were going to support the opium growers in 
Afghanistan, “Shouldn’t the U.S. at least try to avoid what happened in Loas? Shouldn’t 
the U.S. attempt to pay the opium growers to eradicte their opium production?” His 
arguments fell on deaf ears.76 In fact this is not the last time this would be suggested nor 
attempted. In the mean time the mujahideen commanders were beginning to utilize their 
newfound CIA support and international ties to the global heroin market.  
In 1980, the U.S. declared that “any attempt by an outside force to gain control of 
the Persian Gulf region will be expelled by any means, including military force.” The 
Carter Doctrine as it came to be known internationalized the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan.77 At the same time President Carter indicated U.S. intent “to help Pakistan 
defend its independence and its national security against the seriously increased threat it 
now faces from the north.”78 Simultaneous opium trafficking was simply an ignored 
consequence of the Cold War in Afghanistan. The trucks that carried the CIA bought 
weapons to the border regions to supply the mujahideen returned carrying heroin to ship 
to the international market. The CIA support network was being used to move drugs.79 
Despite the implications of the CIA in the drug trade, the CIAs role in the heroin traffic 
was an inadvertant consequence of its Cold War tactics.80 The West was blamed for the 
upsurge in heroin and drugs in Pakistan as money from the Western Governments flowed 
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into the region.81 Without the backing of the CIA, the Pakistani Intelligence Service 
would not have been such a significant narcotics support network during the 1980s. As 
with Afghanistan during the 1960s, Pakistan accounted for 100 tons of heroin during this 
time.82 The U.S. also made an effort to conceal the extent of the drugs by issueing a 
stream of deflated reports on the severity of the opium trade to maintain the support of 
the Pakistani intelligence to the Afghan struggle.83 A financial money laundering front, 
the Bank of Credit and Comerce (BCCI), was used as a go between for Peshawar, 
Washington, Switzerland and Hong Kong. Within a year of initiating U.S. support for the 
war, Afghan heroin began flooding the global market through Pakistan.84 
As early as 1979, Ismatullah Muslim led his tribe into the resistance and 
conducted smuggling of arms and drugs between Qandahar and Quetta.85 In the 1980s, 
Harakat commander Mullah Nasim Akhundzada became a powerful warlord in Helmand 
Valley based primarily on his control of the opium production.86 The Helmand River 
Valley project was beginning to show global potential for agricultural products, just not 
the kind the DEA or USDA would have preferred.  
As the mujahideen captured prime agricultural areas inside Afghanistan, the 
guerillas ordered peasant supporters to grow poppies, doubling the country’s opium 
harvest to 575 tons between 1982 and 1983.87 Sale of cash crops to external markets 
could substitute for access to external political networks. The opium mullahs of Helmand 
developed a financial base for despotic warlordism.88 U.S. government estimate stated 
that heroin from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region accounted for 51 percent of the 
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U.S. supply in 1984.89 During the war the Soviets employed a scorched earth policy and 
a quarter of farmers reported destruction of irregation systems by 1985.90 The inevitable 
outcome was the supplanting of regular crops by the now ubiquitous poppy crops which 
grew in much more harsh conditions. No efforts were shown during the Soviet 
occupation to actually reduce the production, dependance, trafficking or internal 
consequenses of opium, and the practice of growing poppy would became second nature 
to the farmers throuout Afghanistan.  
D. 1989–96, FEW U.S. OPTIONS DURING INTRASTATE TURMOIL 
A decidedly small number mujahideen commanders had actively promoted poppy 
cultivation during the war, but as U.S. funding tapered off following the Soviet 
withdrawal and refugees returned to claim their land, opium production and export finally 
became systematic.91 What ‘decidedly small’ meant was subjective, however, with the 
threat of the Soviet Union removed and the U.S. funding cut off, the restless mujahideen 
needed to maintain their established fiefdoms and poppy cultivation guaranteed this, 
especially given the international networks the druglords now enjoyed. Yet the 
lawlessness in Afghanistan was the perfect scenario for well armed mujahideen groups to 
fight wars for control of the opium. In addition to the U.S. streamlining the opium trade 
in Afghanistan, the Pakistani networks were also exposed. Pakistan cracked down on the 
opium networks in 1993 and drove them into the lawless districts of Afghanistan, another 
CIA legacy exposed.  
After the Soviet withdrawal the U.S. decided to stop all aid and not assist in 
rebuilding the country. The Afghans viewed the U.S. as responsible for the destruction of 
their country.92 A popular Afghan sentiment is that the drug trade in Afghanistan has a 
long history, of which Washington has convieniently publicly become aware only during 
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the late 1980s, with the de-escalation of the Soviet confrontation.93 This implied the 
complicity of the U.S. during the war but dissinterest with the fallout afterward. 
Warlord rivalries following the collapse of the Russian occupation forced heavy-
handed treatments of the population in order to exploit the most lucrative export, 
heroin.94 The U.S. attempts to intervene during this time out of a selfish anti-Soviet 
mentality and disregard for the population of Afghanistan is best summed up by President 
Carter’s national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, “What was most important…? 
The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet Union? Some stirred up Moslems (sic) or the 
liberation of Central Europe and the end of the Cold War?”95 This emphasized that the 
focus of efforts was Cold War orientated and how deal with the opium problem following 
the Soviet withdrawal was of little concern.  
The U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Robert Oakley, did manage to secure a deal in 
1989 with Mullah Nasim Akhundzada, to surpress opium production in Helmand, the 
epicenter of opium production, for $2 million in ‘aid’. What a steal, however, Nasim was 
assassinated and his brother took over, which killed the deal. Nasim did have the ban in 
place for a short while tripling the price of opium.96 Ghulum Rasul, Nasim’s brother, 
ordered the peasants to resume full opium production due to the U.S. stance of no 
negotiation with drug traffickers. He was still willing to reduce opium production if 
substitutes were found, however, no deal ever went through.97 The opium growing, 
heroin refining, and smuggling supported an age old tradition of becoming a ‘Khan’, 
which meant being in autonomous control of a portion of the country, and it was alive 
and well in Afghanstan.98 
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Requests made in 1994, to aid in the humanitarian crisis during the mujahideen 
warring, found the U.S. unwilling to help do to “budgetary constraints.”99 However, the 
U.S. didn’t completely cut off aid to the Afghan people, aid was provided through neutral 
channels. UNOCHA, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Assistance in Afghanistan, funnelled $512 million to Afghanistan from primarily U.S. 
and Japanese sources.100 
Ultimately, the Taliban gained control and demanded recognition in exchange for 
the eradication of drugs. By this time estimates put 3,000 tons of opium being produced 
in 1996. The U.S. chose not to take the deal in order to maintain its human rights 
stance.101 This led to the continued growth of the international drug trade originating 
within Afghanistan, as well as the continued human rights abuses against the Afghan 
population. The U.S. failed to curtail any of the nefarious activities of the Taliban regime. 
The opium trade from Afghanistan since 1996 has only become progressively larger with 
only a one year ban in 2000–2001.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The problems we are facing today with the illicit drug trade originating in 
Afghanistan is as much to blame on the social economic factors that have plagued that 
country for the last 30 years as on the involvement and disinterest the U.S. paid 
Afghanistan during vital times of development and recovery. The U.S. attitude towards 
Afghanistan in the 1950s and 1960s is one of overall confusion, not fully understanding 
it’s strategic role in the years to come, and ignorance as to the potential threat the country 
might become if left to stagnate.  
If efforts in the 1950s–1960s were lackluster, then efforts in the 1970s can only be 
described as paltry with almost complete disregard, even on the verge of Soviet 
aggression. The fresh memories of Vietnam both frightened the U.S. into inaction, as 
well as fermented desires to force the Soviet Union into the same situation, only to ignore 
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the realities of a regional conflict on the internationalization of criminal narcotics 
networks. The Cold War trumped all notions of having to fight future conflicts in which 
the enemy was near invisible, and with funds that were coming out of U.S. pockets.  
In the 1980s, efforts towards Afghanistan were centered on fighting the Soviets 
and using the Afghans to die for our cause at any price. The explosion of the opium trade 
and the conversion of the Helmand river valley into the opium factory for the world were 
inconsequential, due to the ideological struggle against the Soviet Union. Even U.S. 
attempts to address the opium issue following the conflict were empty gestures, due to 
the complete irrelevance of Afghanistan in the post Cold War era. As before, the U.S. 
became quickly distracted by events in other parts of the world and Afghanistan was left 
to fester in post-conflict turmoil.  
William Kerr Fraser-Tytler (British Minister to Afghanistan, 1935–41) makes an 
earily easily applicable statement to any time in either the 1950s, 1960s, 1980s or 2000s, 
“To anyone with any pre-war knowledge of Afghanistan there is a familiar ring about all 
of this, and I cannot help wondering, not for the first time, how the labours of all these 
various foriegners are commensurate with the costs of maintaining them in so remote a 
country.”102 He was referring to the period of the early1950s, when he wrote his book. 
This is undoubtably a statement those driving the current efforts in Afghanistan need to 
reflect on.  
I shall leave the reader with one of the most ironic statements the U.S. put out 
shortly after the Soviets withdrew, “It should be made clear that the U.S. has no intention 
of supplanting the U.S.S.R. in terms of trying to manage the country.”103 Only 13 years 
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III. OPIUM – WHAT IT MEANS TO AFGHANISTAN’S 
POPULATION AND TO THE INSURGENCY  
A. THE OPIUM TRADE – SOCIAL FACTORS VS. TERROR WEAPON 
Michael Ross makes a compelling argument that sums up much of the factors 
Afghanistan offers to a civil war scenario,   
A state where the rule of law is weak might be unable to attract investment 
in its manufacturing sector, and hence would depend more heavily on 
resource exports; this state might also face a heightened risk of civil war 
through a different process. The result could be a statistically significant 
correlation between resource dependence and civil war, even though 
neither factor would cause the other.104 
Ross continues to surmise that the ‘lootability’ of a natural resource, timber, 
diamond, drug crops, etc., will not start a civil war; however, it will increase the duration 
of the civil war once it has begun. He also states that natural resources are those  that 
cannot be produced, but exist in a fixed geographic location. In the case of Afghanistan, 
the ‘lootable’ resources are almost every export Afghanistan provides. Agricultural 
products, opium, timber, minerals all have fixed geographic boundaries in which they can 
be ‘manufactured,’ but more importantly, the ties to the international trade are vital for 
these industries and lie in the porous borders with all surrounding countries. In addition, 
the weak state security apparatus allows the movement of the ‘lootable’ resources.  
Looking at the media and governmental reports, there is an initial impression that 
the opium trade is the only significant factor for fueling the insurgency; however, looking 
deeper there lie many other sources of revenue readily available. This chapter will cover 
some of the media and government reports on the opium trade, highlighting some of the 
facts and figures. In addition, the opinions of the population, and the mood of those 
growing opium, are also gauged to assess the question as to whether opium is a product 
of necessity in order to sustain an Afghan existence, or the product of the business end of 
a Kalashnikov for the greed of profiteers within a weak state.  
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1. The Farmers 
In 2010, the NATO and Afghan forces took the agricultural area surrounding the 
town of Marjah by force, in an attempt to interdict a large node of the opium industry in 
southern Afghanistan. The following statements capture the popular sentiment summing 
up the connection of the Taliban to opium, “The Marjah region has long been a bastion of 
pro-Taliban sentiment and is where the Taliban had set up a shadow government. It is a 
key area in Afghanistan’s heroin trade and full of the opium used to fund the 
insurgency.”105 This had indeed been the case for an area central to the Helmand River 
Valley project that was geographically isolated from the town of Lashkar Gah to the east 
and the desert to the north, south and west. The Taliban had indeed been able to exert 
control over this area and maximize its agricultural improvements during the 1960s to 
their advantage. Following years of neglect by the NATO forces, “Marjah, a small town 
in a farming district some 380 miles southwest of Kabul, became a strategic target 
because it is a key supply hub for the opium poppy crop and shelters Taliban.”106 Indeed, 
the Helmand River cuts straight through, north to south, central Helmand and turns to the 
west in southern Helmand flowing into Iran. This ribbon of water has created a network 
of roads from the major poppy cultivating areas to the north toward the borders of 
Pakistan and Iran.  
As an isolated case, this implies that much of Afghanistan would look the same, 
especially where the insurgency is the strongest. Moving from a district level in Helmand 
province to the province itself, the picture of opium in Afghanistan does not look any 
better. “Helmand is the world's largest producer of opium, the main ingredient in the 
production of heroin, and Afghanistan accounts for more than 90 percent of the world's 
opium supply. Some of the proceeds from this multibillion-dollar trade go to fund the 
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insurgency. Profits also line the pockets of corrupt government officials.”107 However, 
this picture of Helmand province is very deceptive; in fact, the situation on the ground is 
much more minimal than first appears.  
The actual agricultural area that is cultivated for opium totals 1.6 percent of the 
total agricultural land in Afghanistan.108 This has been consistent for both the 2009 and 
2010 growing seasons, implying a combination of factors have now maximized the 
opium output of Afghanistan. However, the potential remains for this figure to rise, 
should the price of opium increase due to increased demand, higher farm-gate prices, or 
alternative licit opiate production shortages in other places in the world. What has also 
helped is the infiltration into the high poppy-cultivating regions by NATO troops. As 
seen in a recent press report, the United States is not mistaken as the leader in the push to 
secure the situation in Afghanistan, “The hope now is for the United States to persuade 
the locals to change their crops from poppies, grown to produce opium for the Taliban's 
drug trade, and instead grow crops like wheat, which can help them survive and provide 
income as well.”109 Again looking at a local district the situation across the whole of 
Afghanistan for farmers does not look promising, however, it is much less severe than 
initial press reports would indicate.  
Only 280,700 of 4,145,000 households in Afghanistan, or 6 percent of the total 
households, are involved in poppy cultivation.110 Of the working population, unlike a 
society of the U.S. or Europe where 2 percent-3 percent of the workforce is employed in 
agriculture, 76 percent of the working population of Afghanistan is employed in 
agriculture. Of the percentage of those employed in agriculture, the amount of households 
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involved in poppy cultivation still only reaches 9 percent.111 Thus the facts prove that 
although Afghanistan provided 66 percent of global poppy cultivation in 2010 the 
agricultural population does not universally embrace it.  
The Senlis Council report from 2007, which contains over 40 interviews with an 
assortment of the Afghan population, has the major recurring theme of the unemployed 
population joining the insurgency out of financial necessity and lack of alternative 
opportunities.112 According to the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion 
Research (ACSOR) based in Kabul only four percent of Afghan adults responding in 
2010 deemed poppy cultivation/drug trade as the ‘biggest problem’ in Afghanistan. The 
number one problem Afghans stated was unemployment and lack of jobs, followed by 
insecurity. 31 percent of responders to the survey also stated that opium was acceptable if 
no alternatives were available with which to make a living. The survey also shows that 11 
percent of those surveyed believed drug traffickers were the ‘biggest danger’ to 
Afghanistan, only second after the 69 percent who viewed the Taliban as the biggest 
threat.113 
The poppy farmers have large economic incentives for cultivating poppy and 
harvesting the opium. In 2010, the total farm-gate proceeds were estimated at $605 
million, with the average for household that cultivating poppy at $2433. This exceeds the 
net income from the cultivation of wheat by 4:1, a lucrative crop at current prices.114 In 
2007, this was not the case, which makes it understandable as to why the poppy is not 
more of a ubiquitous crop. “In 2007, a farmer could expect returns of about $320 per acre 
of wheat and $640 for an acre of poppy. But by this spring, the return on an acre of wheat 
had risen to $840 per acre, while poppy had fallen to $400 an acre.”115 The global food 
price increases the world has seen over the last several years hold the potential to even 
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the ratio of opium to wheat cultivation, and will naturally supplant the poppy as a cash 
crop due to simple economics. According to a U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime report 
released in September, the value of Afghan opium skyrocketed from $29 per pound in 
2009 to $77 per pound in 2010, fueling fears that production levels will soon follow 
upward. Although the amount of land devoted to growing poppies has remained the same 
over the past year—about 304,000 acres—the number of families producing the crop has 
grown. In all, more than 1.5 million Afghans depend on the sale of drugs for their 
livelihoods.116 Along with some of the economic incentives for the farmers, there does 
come some coercive elements as well, “the Pajhwok News Agency reported on October 
30, 2005 that farmers in the Khan Nishin District in Helmand province were being forced 
by the Taliban to cultivate poppies under threat of death,” and, “there are also regular 
reports of cooperation between political insurgents and profit-driven criminal groups. 
One example is their collusion to throw small farmers off their land or to indenture them 
under debts and threats in order to maintain opium production.”117 However, this may 
well be isolated to those areas insecure enough, the farmers feel they have no alternative, 
but to comply with the insurgent or criminal network demands.  
David Mansfield gives a very detailed year to year account of the motivations of 
the population involved in the opium trade, and explores the financing systems that 
sustain the poppy cultivation, as well as the socio-economic traps that the Afghan farmers 
fall into when dealing with the narco-traffickers. In a report from July 2008, David 
Mansfield describes several factors the farmers throughout Afghanistan take into account 
when growing their crops. The first factor he noted was the preponderance of farmers to 
grow licit crops following the eradication of poppy crops the year before. He also noted 
that farmers were more inclined to grow poppy where the insecurity was highest, which 
is where the road taxes were excessive when moving produce from farms to district 
centers. His paper also alludes to the fact that, of those areas where the farmers do not 
travel with their goods, the criminal networks will collect the opium harvest directly from 
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the farm-gate, which leads to a distinct relationship where the farmers understand the 
importance of the crop and have to do little in order to move the fruits of their labor. The 
road taxes, Mansfield notes, were mainly thought to be a product of the corrupt 
government as opposed to the insurgency. This report also highlights the ten percent ushr, 
or Islamic tithe, the farmers give with the insurgents receiving 5 percent and the village 
mullahs receiving the other half.118 This would indicate the efficiency in collecting the 
ushr, by simply concentrating on the village mullahs. Also, this highlights the mullahs 
role as the dominant figure within the rural life of the Pashtun population, as opposed to 
the historical leaders being the village elders.119 
During 2010, an unrecognized fungus was found to be sapping the yields of the 
poppy crops throughout Afghanistan. The reduced yields expected in early 2010, pushed 
the price of farm-gate opium up along with the more refined dry opium. This gave some 
good insight into the financial dynamics between the insurgents, farmers, and traffickers, 
“Farmers suggest that the amount of opium the Taliban insurgents collected last year was 
worth nearly $3 million in the local market. The insurgents are likely to pocket hundreds 
of millions of dollars because a price increase will multiply the value of their opium 
stockpile.”120 As the UNODC documents stated in 2010, the farmers as a whole receive 
approximately one half of the net proceeds, compared to the insurgents and traffickers 
moving the opium out of the country. This was a sharp improvement from 2009, when 
the ratio was 1:5 in the traffickers’ favor, much to do with the global price not rising in 
kind with the price paid for the reduced yields in Afghanistan at the farm-gate.121 The 
most obvious impact of this shift is the amount of revenue the insurgency can generate, 
acting as the middleman for the narcotics trade. Another less obvious revelation from 
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these figures is the strength of the farmers, understanding that the reduced yields will 
create a higher demand for their product and financially capitalizing on this fact.  
A significant factor, outside that of the financial needs of the Afghan farmer, also 
plays a more sinister part in the nature of the poppy cultivation. The collusion of the die-
hard insurgents and the pan-national narco-traffickers has also kept poppy cultivation in 
Afghanistan at historic levels throughout the 2000s. In 2008, UNODC Executive Director 
Antonio Maria Costa stated: 
The UNODC assessment shows that almost 80 percent of villages with 
very poor security conditions grew poppy, while opium grows in only 7 
percent of villages unaffected by violence. This is further proof of the 
overlap between high insecurity and high cultivation. The message is 
clear: in order to further reduce the biggest source of the world's deadliest 
drug, there must be better security, development, and governance in 
Afghanistan.122 
The link between the level of insurgent activity and opium harvesting can only 
indicate the farmers of Afghanistan are either making rational choices, or are being 
influenced. For the farmers the question is simple, why not harvest opium to make greater 
profits while the government cannot establish security or effectively eradicate. 
Alternatively, the farmers are influenced in their decision to harvest opium through 
insurgent or criminal coercion. Either way, the lack of effective security is assisting the 
harvest of opium and keeping Afghanistan number one in the world’s producers of 
opium.  
2. The Insurgents 
Much of the literature and media attempts to put economic figures on the amount 
of money the Taliban skims from the opium trade; however, the accounts vary 
significantly, and there are also questions of funding sources altogether. “Economics, 
greed, or profit play  marginal roles despite a booming annual Afghan poppy industry 
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valued at $2.6 billion (or 36 percent of the licit gross domestic product) in 2008.”123 This 
implies the Taliban are motivated by their religion vs. the successful trafficking in heroin, 
a tough pill to swallow given the enduring success of the Afghan narcotics trade, the 
known ties between the Taliban and the narco-traffickers, and the necessity of funding 
the persistent insurgency. In addition, as the population of Afghanistan themselves feel 
the poppy cultivation is insignificant compared to the threat of the Taliban or the criminal 
networks using the opium production for profit.  
Looking at a few of the ‘official’ and media assessments of the revenue garnered 
from the opium trade, one gets the idea of the scale and ambiguity of the opium financing 
the insurgency collects. “Opium production provides up to 40 percent of the Taliban total 
financial support.”124 “The $3.4 billion opium crop of 7,700 metric tons (2008) produces 
weapons and supplies for the Taliban. Drug money is a fifth of the gross national product 
(GNP). Afghanistan produces 93 percent of the global supply of heroin. This criminal 
trade funnels $200–400 million into the Taliban and the warlords.”125 
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reports in 2008, puts the Taliban 
income at $200–400 million for the narcotics trade.126 The report goes on to state, “in 
Afghanistan, authorities impose a charge (called ushr) on economic activity, traditionally 
set at 10 percent of income. Opium farming may have generated $50–$70 million of such 
income in 2008. Furthermore, levies imposed on opium processing and trafficking may 
have raised an additional $200–$400 million.”127 What was not in question among the 
literature was the fact that, “Opium was funding the insurgency, and, in turn, the 
insurgency enabled drug cultivation to continue.”128 The glaring ambiguities lie in the 
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different contexts in which the finances of the Taliban are reported. Some report in 
simple percentages, percent of gross national product, percent of total insurgent funding 
(which is an educated guess at best and therefore impossible to guess what percent of that 
the opium is!), and the $200–$400 million sum, seemingly derived from the single 
source, the UNODC.  
Looking at Hayder Mili’s article from 2006, which again quotes the UNODC: 
The opium yield blossomed in 2006, rising to 6,100 metric tons. This 
marked a 49 percent increase over 2005, yielding an estimated $755 
million to farmers on the basis of a slightly decreased farm-gate price of 
$125 per kilogram of dry opium.129  
The interesting fact about the figures from 2006, is that the zakat collected in 
2006, given the historical ten percent figure, only amounts to $75 million. Adding the 
ushr collected directly from the farmers in the form of raw opium, claimed to be ten 
percent of the crop, the total proceeds for the insurgency is somewhere near $225 million 
in 2006. This is demonstrated later as a recurring source of revenue in insurgent 
controlled areas.  
The following excerpt is from an article on the first narco-trafficker extradited to 
the U.S., which describes the relation of criminal networks to the Taliban from 1996–
2001, when the Taliban were the de-facto government in Kabul: 
The Organization then arranged for the heroin to be transported from 
Afghanistan and Pakistan into the United States, including New York 
City, hidden inside suitcases, clothing, and containers. Once the heroin 
arrived in the United States, other members of the Organization received 
the heroin and distributed the drugs. These co-conspirators then arranged 
for millions of dollars in heroin proceeds to be laundered back to Baz 
Mohammad and other members of the Organization in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. According to the indictment, the Organization was closely 
aligned with the Taliban in Afghanistan. During the course of the 
conspiracy, the Organization provided financial support to the Taliban. 
More specifically, between 1994 and 2000, the Organization collected 
heroin proceeds in the United States for the Taliban in Afghanistan. In  
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exchange for financial support, the Taliban provided the Organization 
protection for its opium crops, heroin laboratories, drug-transportation 
routes, and members and associates.130 
The dynamics of this relationship were set up while the Taliban were in power 
and attempting to ostensibly broadcast the un-Islamic nature of the entire drug chain. One 
example of an edict the Taliban released on 10 September 1997: 
The State High Commission for Drug Control issued the following 
declaration through the Taliban’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “The 
Islamic State of Afghanistan informs all compatriots that as the use of 
heroin and hashish is not permitted in Islam, they are reminded once again 
that they should strictly refrain from growing, using and trading in hashish 
and heroin. Anyone who violates this order shall be meted out a 
punishment in line with the lofty Mohammad and Sharia law and shall not 
be entitled to launch a complaint.”131 
Despite the overt calls for eradication of drug production and use, the Taliban had 
established and profited from the narco-criminals throughout Afghanistan. These 
networks most likely did not disappear when the Taliban were forced to relinquish 
control of the Afghan state. Indeed, this long-standing relationship is common 
knowledge.132 In Gretchen Peter’s book she attributes the vast majority of the Taliban 
success since their 2001 defeat to the heroin proceeds in southern Afghanistan, “the 
insurgency is exploding precisely because the opium trade is booming,” however, she 
goes on to show that the Taliban force the population to grow set quotas, making the 
poppy cultivation not just tolerated but forced.133 
Evidence to support Peter’s assessment is easily found in the following:  
A Western law-enforcement official in Kabul who is tracking Khan says 
that after a tip-off in May, agents in Pakistan and Afghanistan turned up 
evidence that Khan is employing a fleet of cargo ships to move Afghan 
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heroin out of the Pakistani port of Karachi. The official says that on return 
trips from the Middle East, at least three vessels brought back arms, such 
as plastic explosives and antitank mines, which were secretly unloaded in 
Karachi and shipped to al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters.134  
This is clear evidence that the relations the Taliban had established during their 
control of Afghanistan were endearing, given the complacency of the Pakistani ISI and 
the profit margins associated with a protracted conflict.  
Several policy papers stand out, which address the opium market’s link to 
insurgency. Christopher Blanchard (Congressional Research Service) give a detailed 
account of the opium economy and it’s implications for Afghanistan and the region. He 
goes on to discuss policy options to counter the opium trade.135 These policies are built 
on evidence of the disruptive nature of the opium trade to the internal security in 
Afghanistan, seen in the following reports.  
The foreign support to the insurgency is covered in Chapter IV, however, Iranian 
support to the insurgency in a BBC report creates a good link between the insurgency and 
the criminal networks, “The disclosure that weapons are still freely flowing across the 
border follows Afghan army claims that Iranian weapons were recovered from a 
notorious Taliban and drug trafficker haven in Helmand province.”136 This revelation 
enhances not only the link between the insurgency and the criminal networks, but also the 
link between narcotics trafficking and weapons procurement.   
Deepak Lal incorporates an extensive history of the opium trade going back a 
century and uses this as a backdrop to highlight the increasingly dangerous nature of the 
opium trade in financing terrorism and insecurity. He incorporates economic theory to the 
opium market and uses world figures for the opium trade to analyse the incomes from the 
illicit activity. An interesting facit of Mr. Lal’s argument is that of legalization in order to 
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drive the cost of opium consumption into prohibitive territiory through steep taxation and 
tariffs. He argues that setting a globally universal opium price with steep tax rates would 
lead to a black market maintaining criminal endevours. He states the ideal economic 
theory for opium is free market enforced through law and custom to minimize the cost 
overspillage of cost prohibitive enforcement measures.137 
The extensive networks moving opium out of Afghanistan extend to every 
direction from Afghanistan, not really surprising given the 77 percent of global 
production the country accounts for. “Out of Afghanistan’s total opium production, 21 
percent is trafficked northward through Central Asia. Around 31 percent travels directly 
to Iran, which has suffered considerable human and financial costs in responding to both 
the direct drug traffic and the substantial opiate shipments arriving via Pakistan.”138 
Almost half of the opium is trafficked to Pakistan for refinement to heroin in the relative 
safety of the Pakistan border regions. In order for effective interception of these 
shipments and processing labs the Pakistan authorities need to exercise greater control 
along the border regions. Pakistan has taken the completely opposite approach to the 
insurgency, from simple complacency to outright management and all manner of support 
to the insurgents. Unfortunately, for the coalition efforts in Afghanistan, not to mention 
the billions of dollars in aid money that is given to Pakistan for its support in the war on 
terror, the U.S. continues to publically ignore Pakistan’s playing on both teams.  
3. Mitigation 
Dr. Robert Looney highlights the difficulties of weaning the Afghan population 
off of the poppy cultivation, which is an impediment to government legitamacy and fuel 
for the insurgency, through the criminal networks.139 In fact, after reflecting upon Dr. 
Looney’s conclusions, the expectation in light of increasing security across Afghanistan, 
even with the currently (2011) high troop levels, that the criminal networks and insurgent 
forces would relinguish the lucrative ground gained so far, is fantasy. The 132,000 
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foreign coalition troops and the official figure of 250,000 Afghan security forces are 
severly hampered by the given cost of maintianing a presence in such a remote place on 
the globe. The best tactic for the opposition forces is to lie low until a reduction in the 
foreign troop presence allowed an easier resurgence or cooption of the Afghan security 
forces. The criminal networks and shadow governments could continue to operate where 
security is weakest, shifting the focal point of the coalition effort until the Western 
governments are forced to relinguish due to budgetary constraints. The insurgency on the 
other hand would continue to create and compile revenue for the enevitable weakening of 
effort by the coaltion forces while the criminal networks continued their opium 
sponsorship in the weaker areas.  
The lack of anti-narcotic program immediately following the invasion of 
Afghanistan inevitably lead the resurgent Taliban to utilize the criminal narco-traffickers 
to produce revenue and move supplies. The opium, ultimately, is not the issue, but the 
lack of security throughout the agricultural rural areas where the Taliban were allowed to 
fully infiltrate. This allowed coercion of the population, and the zakat and ushr to be 
levied upon the profitable opium crop. Now that the Taliban is established, take away the 
opium and the insurgents will levy taxes on the licit crops, transportation networks and 
labor force. The removal of the poppy cultivation will only bring about the demise of the 
criminal narco-trafficking elements, currently taking advantage of the freedom of action 
within Afghanistan.  
As Deepak Lal emphasizes, the global fight against the plight of opiates is a 
difficult path to navigate, given the complexity of balancing the costs vs. rewards to a 
state willing to legalize such a commodity. Indeed, without legalization there is a heavy 
cost as the reliance to control the illicit drug trade is upon primary source countries to 
effectively exercise their sovereignty. Unfortunately, this has often fallen to weak states 
to burden, and ultimately they allow the conditions for illicit crop to remain within their 
borders. Western governments wishing to contain the illicit drug trade, especially from 
the origination countries, will push resources into those countries, in hopes of degrading 
the narcotics flow. Whether the coalition was present in Afghanistan or not, there would 
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still be a large financial burden in attempting to curtail the opiate trade, just as there has 
been in the Golden Triangle in Southeast Asia and Colombia in South America.140 
The January 2010, State Department document concerning the Afghanistan and 
Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy states as one of its main focus points, that the 
coalition aims to “reduce the funding that the Taliban receives from poppy 
cultivation.”141 This statement is subject to misinterpretation by readers who will assume 
the Taliban relies heavily on the opium trade to continue the insurgency. The next chapter 
will concentrate on revenue sources to the insurgency apart from the opium trade. These 
areas have gotten far less media attention, perhaps due to it’s internal and regional 
impacts, vise the global impacts of opium and heroin.  
4. Conclusion 
The interdiction of the opium trade has paradoxical consequences. Of the 1.5 
million Afghans who have financial gain from the poppy cultivation, the eradication 
would mean an even greater social impact if not properly managed. Conversely, if the 
opium trade is not curtailed, the narco-traffickers will continue to exploit the farmers of 
Afghanistan and support the insurgent forces that protect the profitable business. In 
addition, the mitigation of the insurgent capabilities is the overall goal; yet the cultural 
understanding with the population and the establishment of control over regions of 
Afghanistan will be hard to overcome, with or without opium. The insurgents will simply 
raise revenue from the licit crop trade. The potential revenue of $400 million or more to 
the insurgency allows the continuation of the conflict and the continued securing of the 
opium production centers. What impact the elimination of opium proceeds to the 
insurgency will have, is evaluated in Chapter IV, along with estimates of the financial 
burdens of continuing the conflict.  
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IV. ALTERNATIVE REVENUE FOR THE INSURGENCY 
A. ANALYSIS OF REVENUES OTHER THEN ILLICIT DRUGS 
Since 2008, understanding the extent of the alternative revenue sources for the 
insurgency have gained momentum, and in some cases are now considered more 
important than the opium trafficking proceeds. The alternative funding sources have 
come under closer scrutiny and have been given a level of appreciation that is 
commensurate with their revenue generating potentials, with estimates from 60 percent to 
80 percent of the total insurgent finances, “Gen. Dan McNeill, commander of the NATO-
led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), “It is my best subjective estimate that 
the insurgency enjoys fiscal resources from the cultivation of poppy probably to the level 
of 20 percent to 40 percent of its total fiscal resources,””142 The estimate given by Gen. 
McNeill in 2006 seemed isolated during this period of time, despite looking in the right 
direction. This does not therefore remove the opium trafficking as an important source 
but does raise questions as to the potential damage to the insurgency should the opium 
proceeds be diminished. This chapter will look at the various revenue sources in 
Afghanistan and the potential revenue to the insurgency.  
Media sources, such as Eric Schmitt’s New York Times article, ‘Many Sources 
Feed the Taliban War Chest,’ put facts and figures together and surmize that the total 
Taliban funding could be well over 500 million dollars annually.143 However, the 
breakdown needs to be more carefully understood, in order to enable security forces to 
find significant mitigation avenues available, both inside and outside of Afghanistan. 
Gretchen Peters wrote in 2006: 
Today, there's raging debate among experts over how much the Taliban 
leadership depends on heroin for its financing. Some say that donations 
from wealthy Arabs and financial support from Pakistan make up a larger 
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portion of the Taliban's financing than heroin. I don't believe Mullah Omar 
and his top counsel are involved, but they have clearly allowed 
[trafficking] to happen," says the Western official.144  
Apparently, the ‘raging’ debate did not produce much in the way of recognition of 
the alternative sources of revenue, nor the substantial capability of those sources. Only 
since 2008 has this become more of a mainstream idea. This is not hard to understand, 
given the difficulties of attempting to mitigate just one significant revenue source, opium.  
More careful scrutiny of the alternative revenues available, has led to several 
more detailed looks at this phenomenon, “The Taliban-led insurgency has built a 
fundraising juggernaut that generates cash from such an array of criminal rackets, 
donations, taxes, shakedowns and other schemes that U.S. and Afghan officials say it 
may be impossible to choke off the movement's money supply.”145 Much of this has 
stemmed from the military placing more emphasis on these alternative revenues, and 
understanding the difficulties the coalition effort would have in combating the diverse 
nature of the insurgent financing. In 2009, General McChrystal’s Commander’s Initial 
Assessment included the following passage: 
The three main insurgent groups require resources, mainly money and 
manpower. The Quetta Shura Taliban derives funding from the narcotics 
trade and external donors. The Haqqani Network similarly draws 
resources principally from Pakistan, Gulf Arab Networks and from close 
association with Al-Qaeda and other Pakistan based insurgent groups. 
Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin seeks control of mineral wealth and smuggling 
routes in the east.146 
Appreciation of the extensive funding the Taliban receives led the then U.S. 
Afghanistan mission commander to state, “Eliminating insurgent access to narco-profits, 
even if possible, and while disruptive, would not destroy their ability to operate so long 
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as other funding sources stay intact.”147 The assessment did not break down the specific 
methods of financing being utilized by insurgents throughout Afghanistan. While some 
media sources identify a few of the insurgent revenues:  
These other sources range from kidnapping to taking a cut from mining 
and logging industries to taking a percentage off the top of the multi-
billion industry of non-governmental organizations, or NGOs, that operate 
on the tax dollars of the same coalition countries that are fighting against 
the Taliban.148  
This thesis focuses on examining all alternative sources. This paper identifies 
eight separate revenue sources that include: foreign donations, insurgent fundraising, 
natural resource exploitation, warlord protection racketeering, extortion and corruption, 
kidnapping and ransom, licit business taxation, and foreign state actions.  
1. Foreign Donations 
It was known during the 1990s, the Taliban was receiving aid from Saudi Arabia, 
United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan. In ‘Invisible History’, the author’s tie the rise of the 
Taliban to the Middle Eastern states, who imposed their will on Afghanistan, and 
remained tied to the Taliban, without adding much in the way of quantifiable data to back 
up these claims.149 Craig Whitlock, a Washington Post journalist answers the question of 
the continued support to the insurgency as of 2009:  
It's unclear whether the flow of foreign donations to the Taliban has 
increased, decreased, or remained stable. I don't think the U.S. government 
was monitoring it that closely until recently. The U.S. officials I 
interviewed said there was no evidence that governments in the Persian 
Gulf region were donating money, as they did in the 1980s and 1990s to 
Afghan fighters.150  
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There may be no direct evidence of donating money from official governments, 
however, the capacity of these countries, not only limited to the three mentioned, to 
generate donations from internal sources is quite large:  
Obama administration officials say the single largest source of cash for the 
Taliban, once thought to rely mostly on Afghanistan's booming opium 
trade to finance its operations, is not drugs but foreign donations. The CIA 
recently estimated that Taliban leaders and their allies received $106 
million in the past year from donors outside Afghanistan.151  
These figures are interesting compared to those estimated in Chapter III of $200–
$400 million for narco-trafficking alone. If the CIA estimates the $106 million is the 
largest source of funds, that would put many estimates of the narco-funds too high as 
much as 100 percent to 400 percent. Looking at the resource flow from the Gulf States, 
much of the financing is brought through the madrassas and Hawala networks in 
Pakistan, from which the money is easily transferred through the porous border into 
Afghanistan.152 Based on the above excerpts, the external funding the Taliban has been 
receiving has gone largely unnoticed until recently, perhaps due to the informal banking 
systems used or by diversion into fighting the prevalent opium trade, which was widely 
credited for funding the insurgency. Jean MacKenzie quotes Richard Holbrooke, “less 
than half of the war chest comes from poppy, with a variety of sources, including private 
contributions from Persian Gulf states.”153 In other reporting on the new focus of tracing 
the multitude of funding sources, “Mr. Holbrooke said that private donors, including 
some from Persian Gulf countries, were increasingly believed to be a far more important 
source of money for the Taliban than even the opium trade, which the United Nations 
estimates to be about $300 million a year.”154 
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Seth Jones describes how this support from within foreign states is collected, 
where and from whom:  
Most of the Taliban’s funding came from sources other than drugs, 
according to Afghanistan government intelligence estimates. Examples 
include zakat (the Islamic practice of giving alms) collected at mosques in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the broader Muslim world; aid from wealthy 
Arab donors, especially from individuals in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the 
United Arab Emirates; and other forms of profit, such as kidnapping.155 
Assisting in the transfer of funds from the Gulf States to the insurgents is the long 
time relationship with al-Qaeda. Since 2002, one of al-Qaeda’s main roles has been 
diverting wealth from the Arab Gulf States to funding the struggling Taliban. One 
recently killed Saudi sheikh named Asadullah, for example, was described as “the 
moneybags in the entire tribal belt. Men like Asadullah have paid bounties for Taliban 
attacks on coalition troops, provided money to Taliban commanders such as Baitullah 
Mehsud to encourage them to attack Pakistani troops and launch a suicide bombing 
campaign in that country, and used their funds to re-arm the Taliban.”156 
Barakat and Zyck go on to show the lack of oversight within the Islamic charities, 
“Pakistan’s Ministry of Religious Affairs, for instance, can account for only 
approximately $60 million of the more than $1 billion annually given as zakat (charity). 
Observers indicate that a portion of this money finds its ways to Pakistani as well as 
Afghan insurgent groups.”157 If only 2 percent made it to the hands of the insurgents, that 
would equal $20 million, a sum surely higher than this is the true value.  
In the 2010 discussion paper by Matt Waldman, the links the insurgents currently 
enjoy with the Pakistani ISI are laid out in great detail. This includes numerous 
interviews with Taliban fighters who claim to get direct support from the ISI even so 
much as to reward the fighters for successful attacks against coalition troops in 
 
                                                 
155  Seth G. Jones, "The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency," International Security, 2008: 7–40, 9. 
156 Brian Williams, "Return of the Arabs: Al-Qa`ida’s Military Role in the Afghan Insurgency," CTC 
Sentinal (West Point Military Academy ) 1,  no. 3 (February 2008): 32. 
157 Sultan Barakat and Steven Zyck, "Afghanistan's Insurgency and the Viability of a Political 
Settlement," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2010: 193–210, 208. 
 50
Afghanistan by as much as $2,000–$3,000. His paper concludes the ISI, if not directly in 
control of the overall insurgency in Afghanistan, supports all facets of the insurgency, 
both within Afghanistan and Pakistan.158  
Overall, the insurgent funding from Gulf States and Pakistan seems to fall in the 
$100–$200 million dollar range. This is a significant sum, comparable to the proceeds 
from opium trafficking.  
2. Direct Insurgent Fundraising 
The insurgents in Afghanistan have also set up their own fundraising networks, 
utilizing ‘business trips’, and websites. Catherine Collins writes in a New America 
Foundation policy paper, “Substantial sums are also raised from sympathetic individuals 
and charitable organizations in the Persian Gulf states, despite efforts by Saudi Arabia 
and some other governments there to tighten controls. Militant groups maintain their own 
fundraising operations in the United Arab Emirates and other wealthy countries.”159 In 
addition to fundraising networks, insurgent leaders have been known to travel to the Gulf 
States. The United Nations has reported on fundraising trips by insurgents to the Gulf 
States, “From at least 2005 to 2008, Nasiruddin Haqqani collected funds for the Haqqani 
Network through various fundraising trips, including during regular travel to the United 
Arab Emirates in 2007 and through a fundraising trip to another Gulf state in 2008."160 
Even the controversy of the mosque near the World Trade Center in New York 
City is assisting. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah told Newsweek, “By preventing this 
mosque from being built, America is doing us a big favor. It’s providing us with more 
recruits, donations, and popular support.”161 
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Islamic charities have also been linked directly to the U.S., “The American 
Muslim Association of North America (AMANA) has put a number of terror-related 
links on its site. These include links to one of the main websites that was raising funds 
and recruiting fighters for al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and the al-Haramain Foundation 
(AHF), an Islamic charity that has been banned worldwide by the United Nations for, as 
well, being a financing arm to al-Qaeda and the Taliban.”162 These fundraising efforts 
may be small outside of the Gulf States, however, prove the breadth of the effort the 
insurgency is willing to go to for funding. In addition, there is almost no credible 
information as to the proceeds of direct fundraising due to the internal nature of the 
endeavors.   
3. Natural Resource Exploitation 
As was described by Michael Ross in the beginning of Chapter III, the ‘lootable’ 
resources in Afghanistan create lucrative enterprises for the insurgents. The insurgents in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan have co-opted legitimate businesses that either were banned by 
the government, not operating due to insecurity, or stagnating as tribal feuds over revenue 
and land rights were contested. The strong insurgency capitalized on these factors and 
forced the industries to operate often making the population happy with the new income.  
The government of Afghanistan bowing down to international pressure has 
banned the export of logs from areas in the northeast of the country. This leads to a 
lucrative ‘illicit’ product, which the insurgents can export under their protection, and thus 
tax the illegal trade, or run the business outright. Only with competent security forces 
securing the trade, can the government properly regulate the trade of the industry and 
garner taxes. Again this leads to the necessity of two of Afghanistan’s largest failings, 
effective central government and effective national and regional security apparatus’. 
Several authors highlight some of the industries the insurgents are exploiting. 
Shah and Perlez highlight the marble trade as one of the industries the Taliban are 
operating outside of government administration. This is viewed as a significant, “Effort 
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by the Taliban to harness the abundant natural resources of a region where there are 
plenty of other mining operations for coal, gold, copper and chromate.”163 The insurgents 
gain more than money from these operations. The population also supports the Taliban 
effort, as they now can work under protection while performing the ‘illegal’ work. Within 
Afghanistan’s Kunar river valley there was approximately 8 million cubic feet of lumber, 
highly sought after in the Gulf States (known for their lack of forests!), in 2006. Yaroslav 
Trofimov describes the scene: 
The cut wood, valued at tens of millions of dollars, has been slowly rotting 
away since 2006, when President Hamid Karzai banned logging and 
lumber sales in Afghanistan giving a powerful boost to the Taliban-led 
insurgency. Logging has continued unabated here since Kabul imposed the 
ban. But now the industry is largely supervised by the Taliban. They skim 
off the profits and use the smuggling networks established to haul Kunar's 
trees into neighboring Pakistan to transport weapons and men, American 
officers say. As a result, logging clans are now part and parcel of the 
insurgency.164 
The pre-cut wood alone is worth more than $10 million to the local economy, 
with the insurgency reaping greater reward as it sells for inflated prices to dealers in 
Pakistan. The marble industry described above didn’t quite come close to generating as 
much revenue for the Taliban, a mere $45,000 initially plus estimated $500 per day, but 
the locals were happy as the marble industry was again functioning and profitable. In 
2009 the Taliban also took control of an 8km/sq emerald mine in the Swat valley of 
Pakistan and were taking one third of the worker’s proceeds received selling the 
emeralds.165 The ability of the insurgency to create economic enterprises gives them a 
sense of legitimacy among the local populations. What the government is failing to do the 
insurgents manage to accomplish much more rapidly, again relying on smuggling 
networks to transfer goods across the Afghan/Pakistani border with impunity.  
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4. Warlord Protection Racketeering 
Insurgents can garner significant revenues through protection rackets. Although 
the regional insurgent group may not be directly involved in the illicit activity, they will 
provide protection to the transshipment of the material for a fee. The ownership of the 
material in some cases is irrelevant as long as the necessary protection fees are paid. In 
the case of Hajji Juma Khan, a major opium trafficker following the fall of the Taliban, 
“To keep his routes open and the drugs flowing, he lavished bribes on all the warring 
factions, from the Taliban to the Pakistani intelligence service to the Karzai government.” 
In addition he informed on the Taliban and rival narco-traffickers to gain immunity from 
the attention of the U.S. authorities.166 This is a product of the regional instability 
throughout Afghanistan leading to militia control of transit routes, for which taxes/tolls 
can be levied. This also applies to the legitimate trade that occurs. Militias will ‘provide’ 
secure passage for a certain company trucks, if the company has compensated the militia 
accordingly.  
Indeed extortion within Afghanistan seems to be an extremely lucrative business, 
especially where security is compromised. Coalition co-opted warlords give a good 
representation of the money that is flowing into the hands of the Taliban. Matiullah Khan, 
a private Afghan warlord, protects a stretch of road for one day a week and charges, 
“NATO cargo trucks $1,200 for safe passage, or $800 for smaller ones, his aides say. His 
income, according to one of his aides, is $2.5 million a month.”167 A portion of this 
money is inevitably funneled to the insurgents in that area of the country where the safe 
passage of the trucks is guaranteed.  
In a separate account, “The cost, $1,500 per truck from Bagram to Kandahar, with 
$1,500 needed for each truck that continues on to Helmand. Given that convoys are often 
as large as 300 trucks, a single trip might make a security company more than half a 
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million dollars.”168 While the military protects it’s own convoys on resupply missions to 
smaller Forward Operating Bases, the major bases are supplied by convoys travelling 
through Pakistan and entering through either Spin Boldak in the south between Quetta 
and Kandahar or through Torkham Gate in the north between Jalalabad and Peshawar. 
These civilian driven convoys supply U.S. forces are the real breadwinners for the 
warlords and consequently the insurgents. Using the example above, one convoy a week 
from Bagram to Kandahar equals approximately $22 million dollars per year alone. 
Given the convoys moving from the border to Kabul, from Kandahar to Helmand and 
further west the sums could reach into the $100 million dollar range easily, for the sole 
purpose of insuring insurgents not to fire on U.S. goods in transit.  Adam Roston in a 
2009 Gaurdian article cites military contracts to six trucking firms in Afghanistan worth 
$2.2 billion, of which it is estimated 10 percent ends up in the hands of the Taliban, an 
easy $220 million.169 This phenominal sum, from simply moving trucks down the road, 
is not the only source of racketeering.  
Security contracts set up through in country contractors are also known to finance 
the insurgency directly. A recent congressional report about this specific phenomenon 
details how contractors would receive funding and immediately turn the proceeds over to 
the local Taliban. The Taliban elements would in turn purchase weapons and supplies, 
and completing the cycle by attacking the coalition forces the very funds that were given 
to protect.170 This process guarantees job security for the security contractor, as long as 
the contractor is not out and out involved in the attacks. This simply equates to our 
contract dollars being return to us in lethal form! In this declassified document it details 
how one company, of many, was awarded $99.9 million to provide security for areas in 
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northeast Afghanistan, understanding that the men hired worked for a local warlord and 
who was known to conduct criminal activities and anti-coalition activity as well.  
5. Extortion and Corruption  
George Bryjak cites multiple sources with first hand experience the Taliban are 
receiving funding through extortion and corruption.171 “Afghans paid nearly $1bn 
(£658m) in bribes in 2009, more than half said state corruption was fuelling the Taliban's 
growth.”172 Bryjak’s articles also points out the millions of dollars being siphoned off 
from reconstruction projects throughout the country as protection money, and the Taliban 
taxes on businesses to guarantee smooth operations.  
The monies collected from extortion are so lucrative it was reported that insurgent 
groups also vie for these monies in areas with poor security, “Earlier this month, officials 
said that at least 60 militants were killed in fighting between the Taliban and Hezb-e-
Islami in Baghlan province in northern Afghanistan. Reports said they had clashed over 
control of local villages and taxes.”173 With such events occurring the proceeds from the 
extortion and corruption must be extremely lucrative. When attempting to put a number 
on the money siphoned off of aid and military contracts from extortion and corruption, 
“Estimates have ranged as high as hundreds of millions of dollars.”174 Which is not hard 
to image given “eight years of international intervention, and $60 billion in foreign 
aid”175 Not to mention the fact that the poor security throughout large areas of the 
country is pervasive.  
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So far, $60 billion of United States aid money has been given to the government 
of Afghanistan and various organizations working to promote the improvement of quality 
of life for the Afghan population. A percentage of this aid money makes it into the hands 
of the insurgency through extortion. Local examples, are contractors receiving building 
contracts from the government, then paying off the Taliban to not attack the construction 
crew or equipment during the construction phase. Once the contract is complete and the 
contractor is paid, the Taliban are then free to destroy the project per their desire. An 
unidentified contractor stated this exact scenario: 
I was building a bridge, he said, one evening over drinks. The local 
Taliban commander called and said ‘don’t build a bridge there, we’ll have 
to blow it up.’ I asked him to let me finish the bridge, collect the money, 
then they could blow it up whenever they wanted. We agreed, and I 
completed my project.176  
A media source in Kabul is reported to have seen a Taliban financier review all 
high-level construction projects from the government and assess fees in order to avoid 
violent harassment of the project. An Afghan contractor who has a robust business using 
U.S. aid funding stated he automatically, “builds in a minimum of 20 percent for the 
Taliban in his cost estimates.”177 
In addition, criminal gangs or the Taliban themselves will use outright threats in 
order to extort wealthy Afghans they know are well off, largely in part due to the 
reconstruction aid pouring into the country. In Kapisa, a local construction mogul was 
repeatedly extorted for hundreds of thousands of dollars until he was forced to flee the 
country, after his son was badly wounded during a kidnapping attempt.178 It is difficult to 
evaluate the funds generated through extortion, as many of the crimes go unreported by 
Afghan locals fearful for retaliation.  
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Given the $60 billion that has come into Afghanistan in U.S. aid money over the 
last nine years, even one percent getting to hands of the insurgents represents 
approximately $70 million a year. Understanding that contractors are known to build in 
20 percent for the insurgent extortion fees, that $70 million has the potential to be much 
larger. The accountability for the massive aid packages has not helped, as the U.S. 
agencies in charge of monitoring and distributing the funds, could not account for 10s of 
billions of dollars worth.179 The continuation of massive aid packages disbursed in a 
country with standards of accounting glaringly lacking will only propel this revenue 
generation for insurgents.  
6. Kidnapping and Ransom  
Initially kidnapping and ransom may not seem like a lucrative source of revenue 
in a country where the average gross domestic product is approximately $1000 per 
person. However, the influx of aid money and corruption has created a wealthy class and 
the influx of Western civilians into the conflict zone has create numerous targets for the 
estimated 35 percent unemployed population on which to prey and make a living.180 Not 
all kidnappers may be associated with the insurgency, rather, as the examples below 
show, even those simply out to ransom for profit will cooperate with the insurgency.  
This presence and advocating of NGOs and corporate personnel going into areas 
with less than desirable security apparatus’ will continue to allow the exploitation of 
kidnapping, ransom, extortion and illicit taxation upon unprepared individuals.181 Again 
only a sizable and competent government led security force will mitigate this threat. In a 
recent report the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) writes, “The likeliest cause of 
this trend is the pervasive NGO presence, multiple contested areas, and a leavening of 
active criminal groups along many of the regional roads in the region.”182 This is 
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referring to the recent incident in north Afghanistan in which an NGO worker was killed, 
maintaining the trend of violence against NGO personnel in the region.  
In an incident in the same region, workers from a Hungarian oil firm were 
ambushed, “One driver and one laborer from the MOL oil company were killed while 
two engineers were abducted. The soldiers from paramilitary Frontier Corpse (sic) chased 
the attackers and, during an exchange of fire, four troops were killed.” Successful 
abductions such as these feed the coffers of the insurgency if and when ransoms are paid, 
or a transaction is agreed upon for the release of the captives, such as insurgent prisoner 
release exchanges. This has caught the attention of the ISAF troops stationed in 
Afghanistan as a persistent problem worthy of military action. In a recent incident a 
known kidnapper along Hwy 1 between Kabul and Kandahar was apprehended.183 
Collins also has some good details on the kidnappings taking place, with 
individual kidnappings reported to generate from $200,000–$2 Million per hostage. 
Those generating the largest ransoms are foreign journalists and aid workers, with the 
captures being perpetrated by the Taliban themselves, stating they were making good 
money from such activity.184 
The Rawa News issued a story concerning kidnappings in northern Afghanistan 
targeting wealthy business owners and demanding ransoms of $400,000. The story also 
stated there were 42 kidnappings the previous year and 6o in the first seven months of 
2010 alone, obviously an increasing trend nationwide.185 Can Merey tells the story of 
ordinary Afghans who are targeted for ransom by criminal gangs, demanding excessive 
sums, with no support from the authorities.186 The article states 175 abductions in Kabul 
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in the first 6 months of 2009, with the figure most likely higher given the lack of 
reporting to the authorities. The ransom gained in the story was $200,000 for a doctor 
working in Kabul, although the kidnappers wanted $5 million. 
Matthieu Aikins, a Western journalist, describes his personal experience, when in 
Afghanistan his host was offered $200,000 to let the criminals take him hostage. Lucky 
for Mr. Aikins his host declined the offer. He goes on to state that foreign hostages are 
worth up to half a million dollars. The criminal groups often only do the initial capture 
for fear of massive retaliation, and quickly pass the hostage to larger organizations like 
the Taliban for safekeeping and to receive the ransom.187 
A report from the Clayton consulting firm details the increasing peril of traveling 
throughout Afghanistan. Extrapolating their data shows the number of NGOs abducted in 
2007 was approximately 120. Given the valuable nature of NGOs compared to ordinary 
Afghans, this number of NGOs could fetch up to $60 million in ransom. The report also 
notes that despite the extra protection afforded to the foreign NGO staff, the trend was 
likely to increase, along with the kidnapping of locals.188 Journalists also go into 
unsecure areas and run the risk of being captured by insurgent forces, “We’ve 
documented at least 16 journalist abductions in Afghanistan since 2007. As in Pakistan, 
the kidnapping of journalists is an indicator of how little security there is.”189  
Again the difficulty of quantifying the revenue generated by this activity and the 
exact number of kidnappings makes the potential revenue to insurgents almost 
impossible. Although there is a connection to the insurgents who profit from ransoms, the 
majority of the kidnapping activity seems to be focused on successful Afghan business 
men or their families. Even if the insurgents only profit by $200,000 per NGO or Western 
citizens captured, then the proceeds still amount to millions.  
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7. Licit Business Taxation – Ushr & Zakat 
Coalition forces targeting the opium trade unwittingly open up alternate revenue 
generation. After a major raid on Marjeh in Helmand province, which took out an 
estimated $4 million in narcotics related material, the local commander stated, “We got 
reports post operation that they began to tax the farmers on their wheat and other crops to 
make up for their losses.”190 This was meant to be a positive statement on the impact of 
the counter-narcotic campaign, however, the practice of taxing legitimate business and 
crops is not unknown in the insurgent controlled areas. “The Taliban have begun heavy 
handed tactics of taxation of various businesses to support their campaign.”191 This 
includes varying sums of Zakat, on all manner of businesses. It also includes wheat, fuels 
and animals as Ushr, when the population has excess, instead of monetary Zakat. 
The wholesale transition to licit crops at this stage of the conflict, however 
beneficial to curtail the international drug trade, will have only minimal impact on the 
insurgency within Afghanistan. The Taliban are thoroughly embedded in the Afghan 
countryside and will resort to increased taxation on licit crops, transportation and 
agricultural services. Already part of the Taliban process, a farmer in the Marjah region 
of Helmand is quoted as stating, “We have to give them two kilos of poppy paste per 
jerib during the harvest; then we have to give them ushr (an Islamic tax, amounting to 
one-tenth of the harvest) from our wheat. Then they insisted on zakat (an Islamic tithe). 
Now they have come up with something else: 12,000 Pakistani rupee (approximately 
$150) per household.”192 In addition to taxing households, the Taliban will set up 
checkpoints along provincial roads, and extort the traffic. The potential revenue from any 
Afghan citizen under insurgent control remains as long as the population is allowed to 
conduct business. The licit business taxation, be it farming or brick and mortar enterprise, 
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could in theory generate the equivalent income at the farm-gate or doorstep as opium 
does now. The major impact will lie with the criminal networks that will no longer reap 
huge profits moving drugs. 
8. Foreign State Actions 
Geopolitics plays a significant role in the insurgency within Afghanistan. The 
insurgency would never openly admit, without the support or, at least, the complacency 
of foreign governments the insurgency would be much more difficult to prosecute, if not 
impossible. Much of the support from foreign states has to do with the simple presence of 
U.S. troops in Afghanistan, "There are some countries that are against the polices of the 
U.S. and the United Nations, and they support the guerrillas. The most important role 
belongs to Russia, Iran, and Pakistan."193 This article was written in 2003, not long after 
the Taliban returned to Afghanistan to fight the insurgency, at a time when U.S. troop 
levels were only 20,000 and foreign aid was a fraction of what it is now. The likely 
involvement of Russia is doubtful, as the Russians disliked the Taliban due to their 
support for the Chechen rebels. The support from Pakistan has been covered throughout 
this paper, and the Taliban have had ties to the Pakistani ISI since the beginning of their 
rise to power in 1994. Support from Iran will be the focus for this section. 
An article the Economist notes, “Iran’s Afghan policy has been to make life 
uncomfortable for the occupiers but without destabilizing it’s own borderlands. To this 
end, Iran trains the Taliban and furnishes it with light weapons but carefully directs the 
militants to the south and east of Afghanistan.”194 Iran does not want to create a 
formidable force too near it’s own border with Afghanistan and to maintain influence 
among the western Afghanistan elites. The 2009 State Department report on state 
sponsors of terrorism concerning Iranian support to the Taliban: 
Iran’s Qods Force provided training to the Taliban in Afghanistan on 
small unit tactics, small arms, explosives, and indirect fire weapons. Since 
at least 2006, Iran has arranged arms shipments to select Taliban 
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members, including small arms and associated ammunition, rocket 
propelled grenades, mortar rounds, 107mm rockets, and plastic 
explosives.195 
This last identified source of revenue, foreign state actors, is a great link to the 
informal banking systems that circumvent the computer-aided scrutiny of the Western 
governments. In the most damning evidence against Iran’s involvement in the Afghan 
insurgency, Miles Amoore highlights a complex payment scheme that channels money to 
insurgents: 
Iran is paying bonuses of $1,000 for killing an American soldier and 
$6,000 for destroying a U.S. military vehicle. Iranian companies working 
in Afghanistan win contracts to supply materials and logistics to Afghans 
involved in reconstruction. The money often comes in the form of aid 
from foreign donors. Profits are transferred through poorly regulated 
Afghan banks, including Kabul Bank, which is partly owned by Karzai’s 
brother Mahmood, to Tehran and Dubai. From these countries, the money 
returns to Afghanistan through the informal Islamic banking system 
known as hawala to be dispersed to the Taliban.196 
The overall level of funding Iran and Pakistan provide is somewhat difficult to 
assess. The necessary supplies for the insurgency, in addition to training and logistics 
must run into the millions of dollars annually, however, without direct interdiction of the 
materiel or fighters this support is difficult to cut off or accurately quantify. In the case of 
Iran, “According to the Afghan government's own internal records over the last Islamic 
year 10.5 tons of weaponry was intercepted in Herat province alone, 60 percent of which 
they say comes directly from the Iranian government.”197 
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B. UNDERSTANDING THE HAWALA SYSTEM – THE DIFFICULTIES OF 
INTERDICTION 
The informal banking system is well established and trusted by the local 
population who use this hawala system to obtain loans and move remittances from 
Afghanistan. It is also used by the insurgency to launder finances and collect revenues 
from illicit trade, “The Taliban's access to two major funding streams, one from the 
opium trade and the other from overseas donations from Muslim countries, which reach 
the Taliban by courier or through a system of informal banks (hawalas) that operate 
across much of the Islamic world.”198 The hawalas could be shut down by tracking the 
agents at each end of the transaction, but for countries like Afghanistan, Somalia and 
other nations without widespread formal banking systems, the cost would be devastating 
to the population.  
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) released a good study of the methods 
and trends associated with money laundering known throughout their document as 
‘typologies.’ They identify three reasons a person prefers to use the hawala system over 
conventional banking, not including the lack of alternatives. First, the hawala system is 
personal, maintaining cultural customs and preserving anonymity to the authorities. 
Second, customer service is superior, allowing mobile banking, easy dispute resolution, 
and no formal requirements, for example, multiple currencies in one transaction or goods 
as currency. Third, the hawalas are economical, offering speed, low cost, no account 
maintanence, and no legal requirements to overcome, for example, international transfer 
limits.199 The system that works well for the non-criminal population, works just as well 
for the criminal networks, and those moving funds for illegal activities, such as loans for 
poppy cultivation.  
Thompson gives a good account of the hawala networks, refered to as saraf, in 
that exist Afghnaistan and their operating methods. The report is part of the UN and 
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World Bank report from 2006 on the Afghan opium trade. She highlights the difficulty of 
tracing any funds flowing through the hawaladars due to the fact that 90 percent of 
Afghanistan’s economy moves money in this way as do the criminal networks. She 
estimates in 2004–2005 the hawaladars were able to handle in excess of $6 billion, while 
keeping relative small balances on their books. She estimated 900 hawala dealers in the 
country at this time. An interesting note that Thompson brings out is the fact that despite 
traditional trust networks, usually involving the extended family, the opium hawaladars 
will cross ethnic, linguistic and cultural boundaries to secure their profits.200 The hawala 
system also benefits the diaspora that work in foreign countries supporting the insurgency 
in Afghanistan. The Guardian newspaper recently ran a story concerning a cab driver 
who works to support the insurgency, "There are many people like me in London. We 
collect money for the jihad all year and come and fight if we can."201 Thompson backs 
this by stating the majority of the hawala drug orders, although different than remittances, 
did originate in London.202 
Recent reporting from the Afghan Threat Finance Cell looks to provide some 
promising moves to curb the use of hawala for illegal activity, “the ATFC’s initial steps 
include trying to help institute uniform licensing and attempting to identify hawalas 
involved with insurgent activity. The previous day, the ATFC had helped Afghan 
authorities bust three hawalas connected to insurgents and drug networks.”203 The lack of 
attacks upon hawalas and hawaladars within the insecure areas of Afghanistan is a 
testament to the necessity of this form of monetary transfer system to the local 
population, the insurgents, and criminal networks.  
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A U.S. diplomatic cable released by the WikiLeaks website staff demonstrate the 
knowledge the U.S. has as to the Hawala networks. The diplomatic cable states one 
particular hawala network, New Ansari, "is facilitating bribes and other wide-scale illicit 
cash transfers for corrupt Afghan officials and is providing illicit financial services for 
narco-traffickers, insurgents, and criminals through an array of front companies in 
Afghanistan and the UAE."204 The cable goes on to point out that tracking the funds is 
extremely difficult through the hawala network due to the lack of accountability. More 
recently the New Ansari hawala network and it’s senior management was sanctioned by 
U.S. authorities due to it’s ties to the narcotics industry and illegal transfers of narcotics 
funds. The New Ansari was the largest hawala in Afghanistan, run by businessmen from 
Kandahar.205 
The U.S. State Department released the following information concerning the 
hawala system in Afghanistan: 
Currently, only 3 percent of the Afghan community is banked. 
Afghanistan is widely served by the traditional and deeply entrenched 
hawala system, which provides a range of financial and non-financial 
business services in local, regional, and international markets. It is 
estimated that between 80 percent and 90 percent of all financial transfers 
in Afghanistan are made through hawala. Financial activities include 
foreign exchange transactions, funds transfers (particularly to and from 
neighboring countries with weak regulatory regimes for informal 
remittance systems), micro and trade finance, as well as some deposit 
taking activities. Although the hawala system and formal financial sector 
are distinct, the two systems have links. Hawala dealers often keep 
accounts at banks and use wire transfer services, while banks will 
occasionally use hawaladars to transmit funds to hard-to-reach areas 
within Afghanistan. There are some 300 known hawala dealers in Kabul, 
with branches or additional dealers in each of the 34 provinces. There are 
approximately 1,500 dealers spread throughout Afghanistan that vary in 
size and reach. Given how widely used the hawala system is in 
Afghanistan, financial crimes, including terrorist financing, undoubtedly 
occur through these entities. With only 40 percent of the hawaladars 
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registered, the push should be for registration compliance to ensure 
regulation and mitigation of the transfers of illegal funds.206 
The hawala system works with more than cash or cash equivalents. The hawala 
dealers will allow a crop-for-credit exchange, known as salaam, which allows farmers to 
get loans in order to restock winter supplies or obtain the necessary seed and fertilizer for 
the upcoming season. The farmers agree to sell the crop at an agreed on rate once the 
harvest is complete, potentially damaging if the price of the crop goes up or down 
significantly. If the price rises, the farmers have an agreed upon quantity of the crop that 
must be paid on the loan, or if the price goes down the hawala dealers require the 
equivalent quantity of the crop at current lower market rates, to pay the loan. Either way 
the farmer is best served by a steady rate for the crop.207 This has led to large debts being 
carried by many farmers who were forced not to grow poppy during the Taliban ban in 
2000 and 2001, and more recently during a severe fungal blight in 2010 that devastated 
approximately 25 percent of the opium harvest driving up prices by as much as 50 
percent.208 
The hawala network will be easier to regulate once to security apparatus in 
Afghanistan is strong enough to enforce the registration and reporting from all 
hawaladars. Until this occurs the movement of illicit funds will continue unabated.  
C. CONCLUSION 
While many of these reports are several years old the situation in Afghanistan has 
changed little. The insurgency achieved its most deadly year in 2010, sowing over 14,000 
IEDs, and causing 499 U.S. fatalities as part of the total of 711 coalition.209  The opium 
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cultivation is more heavily concentrated to the south and the government has achieved 
little gain in legitimacy outside of the capital, which is also in doubt after a series of 
suicide bombings in early 2011.210 
In total the potential revenue, whether it be through the hawala system of money 
exchange or direct payments from extortion or ransom, are substantial. Of the eight 
categories of funding identified above the over total is estimated at over $1 billion, 
conservatively, the potential is significantly greater. This is also only the estimated 
alternative revenue, not including the highly lucrative opium trafficking. The underlying 
cause of all the revenue sources available to the insurgency is the lack of effective state 
control of the population, even within the capital city, often touted as the only place 
where the government exerts authority. The insurgency has the ability to generate wealth 
within and outside of Afghanistan, seemingly in excess of the estimates put forth by all 
sources. Chapter V will offer comprehensive conclusions as to the effectiveness of 
interdiction of any of these revenue sources. Before that can be determined, it is 
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V. CONCLUSIONS – THE WAY FORWARD 
A. WHAT THE TALIBAN NEED 
As Dr. Metz and Lieutenant Colonel Millen point out in their paper titled 
‘Insurgency & Counterinsurgency in the twentieth-first century,’ an insurgency needs 
five resources in order to operate successfully. These are manpower, funding, 
equipment/supplies particularly access to arms and munitions, sanctuary and 
intelligence.211 All of these resources are easily identifiable within the Afghan 
insurgency. What is not so readily identifiable is the quantity of each resource the 
insurgency utilizes. Desire to degrade the ability of the insurgencies fighting ability will 
necessitate the identification and eradication of the funding the insurgents generate. The 
funding allows all the other aspects of the necessary resources to function. Without 
funding, no men could be hired to fight, no equipment could be purchased, weapons and 
ammunition could not be bought, sanctuary could not be guaranteed without fiscal 
incentive, and intelligence could not be secured nor intelligence equipment purchased.  
In a 2001 article, Chris Dishman writes of the collaboration of the politically 
motivated forces, in the case of this paper the Taliban and other insurgent groups vying 
for power in their respective regions of Afghanistan, and the criminal networks that 
simply act for the goal of profit: 
Political group—empowered by a criminal alliance—could gain weapons, 
money, intelligence, explosives, and other wartime goods and services. A 
pan-criminal-political alliance would be a force multiplier for radicals, 
sharpening their military edge and making it difficult for legitimate 
governments to combat them.212 
The genesis of the Taliban from state sponsored group, widely known to be 
supported by the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) throughout the 1990s, has 
culminated in what Dishman is describing occurring in Columbia and Kosovo, that of a 
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insurgency aimed at political ascendancy utilizing the criminal elements as proxies. The 
use of criminal elements has blurred the lines between those insurgents fighting for the 
ascendancy of the Taliban to a governing authority, and those who simply profit from the 
lack of security and ongoing conflict. Indeed this very blurring has led the coalition focus 
in Afghanistan on a never-ending mission creep, to which more and more of the criminal 
network activities and nation building efforts now are the focus of military force.213 
Thus the funding the insurgency generates is the critical element to degrading the 
insurgents continued presence throughout Afghanistan. As this paper discusses the 
funding can be separated into that generated from opium production/trafficking and that 
from all other sources. Attacking the narcotics industry in Afghanistan has garnered most 
of the attention of institutions seeking methods of degrading the effectiveness of the 
insurgency. However, there is a lack of conclusive evidence that a significant impact on 
the narcotics industry will produce an equally significant impact on the potential of the 
insurgency to recruit, fund, equip, house, or collect intelligence.   
Fully understanding the insurgency is not beholden to the narco-traffickers, and 
exhibit a dynamic ability to generate alternative revenue, is not enough to claim the 
insurgency is or is not dependant on the proceeds of the opium industry. In order to fully 
appreciate the necessities of the Taliban as a battlefield fighting force with aspirations of 
returning to the pre 9/11 era of governing and control, one must look at the numbers of 
fighters the Taliban employs and the basic needs of said fighting force.  
As was noted in the introduction the estimated numbers for insurgent fighters in 
Afghanistan is somewhere between 25,000 and 36,000 active fighters.214 As the ANA 
and ANP were being rebuilt, to achieve competent forces to who the coalition can leave 
the fate of Afghans security too, the pay for these troops and police was inferior to that of 
the average Taliban foot soldier. The Senlis Council wrote a comprehensive paper in 
2007, concerning the insurgency in Afghanistan, the Taliban fighters were being paid up 
to $400 per month, significantly better than their ANA and ANP counterparts, who only 
                                                 
213  Anthony Cordesman, "More Troops, Less Caveats. Let's Get Serious," The Times, August 10, 
2009. 
214 Jerome Starkey, "Major-General Richard Barrons puts Taleban fighter numbers at 36,000.” 
 71
receive $60 per month.215 Additional sources back up these claims, “$200–$600 per 
month was offered to work for the Taliban. Law enforcement officials corroborated this 
in their report stating that the Taliban successfully recruits young locals to fight for $20 a 
day.”216 Combining these figures, the insurgency spends approximately $11,000,000 per 
month or $130 million per year on recruitment alone. This is based on the troop level of 
36,000 paid at $300 per month, on the high side. Evidence of additional payments based 
on specialized skills, bomb maker, foreign specialist and dangerous operations, mortar 
team, sniper would indicate this price is higher by at least several million dollars.  
The manpower of the insurgency is not the only necessity the insurgency must 
spend funding on. Supplies, which are essential to continuing the fight, consist of 
expensive conventional hardware all the way down to cheap IED triggers. The 14,000 
IEDs placed during 2010 do cost the insurgency to manufacture.217 “It is believed that as 
much as 500,000 metric tons of fertilizers is imported from Pakistan into Afghanistan, 
legally and otherwise.”218 Even if each of the 14,000 IED contained 50lbs of fertilizer, 
that would only amount to 700 tons total, a drop in the bucket. Even at U.S. prices of 
$400 per ton,219 the total for 700 tons equals only $280,000. The cost for the 50lbs of 
explosive for each of the 14,000 IEDs is only $20. The cost for additional components for 
IEDs such as batteries, wires, detonation cord and trigger supplies, is minimal. In total the 
cost for an IED may average $50–$100 dollars. This makes the total for IED construction 
for 2010 at approximately $1.4 million. Considering the same sum could purchase only 
73 500lb guided bombs for the U.S. military, the cost to the insurgency is minimal given 
the impact gained.220 
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Conventional weapons seem to flow into Afghanistan from all sides, most notably 
Pakistan and Iran. The cost for the ubiquitous AK-47 in Afghanistan has varied from 
$150–$400 depending on the demand and availability.221 Even at the $400 price every $1 
million could buy 2500 AK-47s, although it is likely the insurgency benefits from Iran 
and Pakistan in being well supplied with weapons and ammo. Rockets, mortars, and 
cheap small arms sustain the insurgency, with few heavy weapons found or used in 
Afghanistan.222 As far as military vehicles go, the insurgents rely on pick-up trucks and 
motorcycles for the most part.223 While it is difficult to assess the quantity of truck and 
motorcycles the insurgents use, it is reported that criminal networks will supply vehicles, 
insurgents will simply take vehicles from the population, and Pakistan will supply 
vehicles to take into Afghanistan.  
Using the above figures as the largest necessities of the insurgents, the total the 
insurgency needs to sustain the current levels of operations is approximately $150 
million. This is aggregated from the manpower, bomb making and equipment needs of 
the insurgents. While the figure may be higher or lower the overall cost of the continuing 
insurgency is easily sustainable given the revenue generating capability in excess of $1 
billion annually, from the opium trade and the multitude of alternative revenue sources. 
The question derived from these figures is: where can an impact be made upon the 
effectiveness of the insurgency through the interdiction of funds? 
B. MOST BANG FOR THE BUCK (AKA COALITION EFFORT) 
There is no doubt the end state for Afghanistan is reliant on the foreign troops that 
withstand the efforts of the insurgency to perpetuate the current anarchy through lack of 
effective security. What is ideally needed is an effective method to degrade the potential 
of the insurgency to continue to return to the battlefield. This is in my opinion a 
combination of two critical factors. The bolstering of the Afghan government and 
security forces, and the interdiction of the revenue the insurgency needs to recruit 
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fighters, obtain supplies, and purchase weaponry. Identifying the revenue for the 
insurgency is not difficult, but interdicting it is. There is no lack of reporting as to the 
extent of revenue generation and criminal activity on which the insurgency relies. Of all 
the major funding sources to the insurgency, the opium trade has garnered the most 
attention, most likely due to it’s high visibility in the fields of Afghanistan and on the 
streets of Western nations. The U.S. spent over $1 billion dollars in 2009 in counter 
narcotics operations in Afghanistan.224 As great of an effort as this is, no external plans 
for defeating the illicit drug trade will work due to the righteous nature of the Western 
endeavors. It is difficult to translate the disdain for opium that the West has to the farmers 
who know that the crop sells and good profit can be made. The Afghan population simply 
wants/needs to survive, and have ambitions to prosper thus will farm those crops which 
provide for their families. As with any entrepreneur, the farmers of Afghanistan will go 
where the money is and where the authorities allow them. Reasonable ideas for the opium 
harvest have been proposed, for example, purchase.225 Unfortunately, Western 
governments, despite good intentions and well-devised plans, will not purchase opium 
crops with taxpayer’s money. The change has to come from inside Afghanistan in the 
form of economic development and increasing the government legitimacy, both being 
held down by the formidable opium trade and rampart insecurity. The best place for the 
coalition the help this effort, especially from the outside, is the degradation the funding 
the insurgents receive, internally, support the government development and security 
forces buildup.  
Rising food prices on a global scale herald a possible saving grace for those 
opposed to the cultivation of opium, should wheat become fiscally competitive. Recent 
trends in world food prices, currently in 2011 at an all time high, may help to move 
Afghan farmers off of poppy cultivation and on to licit crops.226 However, as a Marine 
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Colonel operating in the Marjeh region of Helmand province notes, “keeping farmers 
away from growing poppies would require finding cheaper and safer ways for them to 
grow legal crops such as wheat.”227 David Mansfield notes two factors that could bring 
about more conversion from poppy cultivation to licit crops, not limited to wheat. The 
first is the rising food insecurity felt both by farmers themselves and through global rising 
prices will bring farmers to plant foodstuffs rather than poppy. Second is the manpower 
availability to the rural areas, which alone does not inhibit opium production, but can 
limit the expansion of poppy cultivation due to the manpower intensive nature of opium 
collection. Any economic increases nationally will move workers from the rural areas, 
heightening the challenges of successful opium harvesting.228 
The wholesale transition to licit crops at this stage of the conflict, however 
beneficial to curtail the international drug trade, will have only minimal impact on the 
insurgency within Afghanistan. The Taliban are thoroughly embedded in the Afghan 
countryside and will resort to increased taxation on licit crops, transportation and 
agricultural services. Only the narco-traffickers will be adversely affected, who, without 
effective local security, will force the population to move back to poppy cultivation.  
Unlike the efforts at the beginning of the war, to ignore the drug trade and 
concentrate on targeting the terrorist elements,229 in order to combat international drug 
trafficking, the coalition focus must be on the narco-trafficking networks. Thus once the 
demand at the farm gate for opium products in stemmed, alternative crops can be 
subsidized, although this again only targets the opium trade and will do little to affect the 
insurgency, given the alternative revenues available.  
New strategies based on the cultural history of Afghanistan have the potential to 
impact opium production. As described in Chapter II, the extensive orchards of the pre-
Soviet invasion time were destroyed in order to prevent ambush sites. This now has the 
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potential to be reversed in the focus to redirect the agricultural efforts of Afghan farmers. 
As the 2010 State Department report on International Narcotics states, “USAID 
agricultural programs in the major opium cultivation areas provided incentives for 
farmers to permanently move away from planting poppy crops by promoting orchards or 
vine crops, as opposed to wheat.”230 This gets to the understanding that planting wheat 
crops will still allow the field the dual use potential should the insurgency or criminals 
force such measures. With orchards or vines the farmer will be forced to convert the 
farmland to accommodate these crops, eliminating the potential reversal to poppy 
cultivation. Also these types of agriculture take significant time to develop into mature 
production thus the farmers are committed and less likely to destroy orchards or vines to 
plant poppy.  
Many ideas have surrounded the mitigation of the opium trade, invariably coupled 
to the strength of the insurgency. The underlying factor behind the profits from the opium 
is not the opium itself, but the permissive nature of the Afghan environment. With the 
opium trade providing up to $400 million a year to the insurgency, the cessation of this 
revenue would certainly cause a significant blow, unfortunately though given the 
abundant alternative revenue the insurgency would continue unabated.  
Most of the alternative revenues available to the insurgency rely on the lack of 
effective security throughout Afghanistan and Pakistan. Thus the focus of the coalition 
must be two-fold. Attack the funding and build the security capability.  
The presence and advocating of NGO’s and corporate personnel going into areas 
with less than desirable security apparatus’ will continue to allow the exploitation of 
kidnapping, ransom, extortion and illicit taxation upon unprepared individuals. Again 
only a sizable and competent government led security force will mitigate this threat. In a 
recent report the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) writes, “The likeliest cause of 
this trend is the pervasive NGO presence, multiple contested areas, and a leavening of 
active criminal groups along many of the regional roads in the region.”231 This is 
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referring to the recent incident in north Afghanistan in which a NGO worker was killed, 
maintaining the trend of violence against NGO personnel in the region. This has caught 
the attention of the ISAF troops stationed in Afghanistan as a persistent problem worthy 
of military action. In a recent incident a known kidnapper along Hwy 1 between Kabul 
and Kandahar was apprehended.232 Although military action against kidnappers is a 
positive step, the elimination of the presence of kidnappers through effective security is 
the long-term solution to this problem.  
In addition to kidnapping, insurgents can garner significant revenues through 
protection rackets. Although the regional insurgent group may not be directly involved in 
the illicit activity, they will provide protection to the transshipment of the material for a 
fee. This is a product of the regional instability throughout Afghanistan leading to militia 
control of transit routes, for which taxes/tolls can be levied. This also applies to the 
legitimate trade that occurs. Militias will ‘provide’ secure passage for a certain company 
trucks, if the company has compensated the militia accordingly. The revenues generated 
through this are among the highest, and only 10 percent to the insurgency equals $220 
million.  
Government inability to regulate industries has lead to a lucrative ‘illicit’ product, 
which the insurgents can export under their protection, and thus tax the illegal trade, or 
run the business outright. Only with competent security forces securing the trade, can the 
government properly regulate the trade of the industry and garner taxes. Again this leads 
to the necessity of two of Afghanistan’s largest failings, effective central government and 
effective national and regional security apparatus’. 
The rampant, and very publically discussed corruption that is pervasive 
throughout Afghan government, needs to be curtailed. In order to maximize the effects of 
aid to Afghanistan, proper allocation of the aid money for it’s intended purpose must be 
insured. Also this will foster the possibilities for healthy, honest competition, in turn 
driving down costs for all businesses.  
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$60 billion of United States aid money has been given to the government of 
Afghanistan and various organizations working to promote the improvement of quality of 
life for the Afghan population. A percentage of this aid money makes it into the hands of 
the insurgency through protection rackets. With sources claiming up to 20 percent of 
project funds are built into contracts for insurgent payoffs, the revenue potential is in the 
$100s of millions. In addition, criminal gangs or the Taliban themselves will use outright 
threats in order to extort wealthy Afghans they know are well off, largely in part due to 
the reconstruction aid pouring into the country.  
Security contracts set up through in country contractors are also known to finance 
the insurgency directly. A recent congressional report about this specific phenomenon 
details how contractors would receive funding and immediately turn the proceeds over to 
the local insurgents.233 The cessation of such contracts will only lead to a greater 
insurgent pool as the manpower employed as security would turn to criminal behavior for 
sustenance. Economic reform, generating significant employment across Afghanistan will 
mitigate the need for private security militias. This economic reform can only be realized 
through the bolstering of local government and improved security.  
Of all the revenue sources the most effective to maximize the impact upon the 
insurgency would be first and foremost the opium trade. Not only would this impact the 
insurgency by $400 million or more, it would also degrade the criminal drug trafficking 
networks that cause insecurity alongside the politically motivated insurgency. The 
international support to the insurgency whether it be from Pakistan, Iran, the Gulf States 
or other donors could severely mitigate the potential combat ability. Most notably 
Pakistan, which supplies everything from funds, material, weapons and safe haven to the 
insurgents. The next largest impact would be gained by reducing the protection 
racketeering, prevalent throughout the country, eliminating up to $220 million or more 
from the coffers of the insurgency. Along with that is the extortion of aid and 
reconstruction projects, given the $60 billion that has flowed into the country, the 
insurgency has extorted hundreds of millions from this business.  
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After assessing the financing capabilities of the insurgency, the question of 
whether the elimination of the opium trade would adversely affect the combat potential of 
the insurgents is definitely no. The transition to licit crop taxation and alternative revenue 
is far in excess of what the insurgency requires in terms of manpower, weapons and 
supplies. The most significant benefit would be to the global fight against drugs, as three-
quarters of the world’s supply of opium would be out of the market place.  
The same goes for the alternative revenue sources the insurgency enjoys. 
Eliminating just one of the alternative sources would not significantly reduce the 
potential of the insurgent forces. However, the only viable method to defeating most of 
these alternative revenues is through increased security and governance internal to 
Afghanistan. When an effective level of security backed by legitimate government 
structures, many of the alternative revenue sources to the insurgency will become 
threatened. Simple oversight measures for aid and reconstruction projects, enhanced 
border security, responsive ANA units throughout the country, government management 
of resource wealth, financial monitoring of the hawala system and alternative to poppy 
cultivation could stem the tide of insurgent funding from both within and outside of 
Afghanistan. This obviously is much easier said than done, especially within a conflict 
zone. If the coalition forces desire a withdrawal with Afghanistan, labeled as successful, 
then internal security is exactly what needs to be focused on in the next several years 
until it becomes successfully self-sufficient, or the coalition time and patience wears out, 
leaving Afghanistan to continued internal conflict, promoted by regional actors.  
C. GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY – THE ONLY WAY FORWARD 
Hayder Mili sums up this paper’s thesis in one sentence, “reducing their financial 
power would undermine an important component of their recruitment model.”234 The 
greater goal is to ultimately degrade the insurgency to the point where the indigenous 
security forces can sustain the momentum and the foreign troops can finally get out of the 
way permanently. The recruitment model does consume a large portion of the insurgent 
funding and if the recruiting alone can be degraded, while simultaneously supporting a 
                                                 
234 Hayder Mili, “Afghanistan’s Drug Trade and How it Funds Taliban Operations.” 
 79
legitimate economic base, the locals will have no choice but to turn to licit work for 
survival. In addition if the recruiting can be undermined, it will lead to a domino effect on 
the rest of the insurgency, with less fighters to control ground and protect revenue 
sources the area the insurgents control will shrink rapidly, thus depriving them of 
additional revenue. The cycle would continue until the insurgents would be constantly on 
the run amid local, provincial and state security forces. A success of that magnitude 
would also lead the supporting neighbors to abandon the insurgency in support of the 
central government. Without a need for foreign troops in Afghanistan, Iran would 
certainly curtail the support to the insurgents. As the downward cycle of the insurgents 
occurs the political gap must be filled, and this is not a lost concept.  
Robert Kemp, after spending four years in eastern Afghanistan, sees the best 
method of defeating the criminal and insurgent forces is the building of legitimate 
governors capable of engaging with the population, coordinating with the Afghan 
security forces, defeat corruption and be a conduit of the central government.235 He also 
emphasizes the role successful governors can play in securing economic funding to the 
local level in order to generate an economy for the population to build on.  
Major Knight highlights a crucial metric that the U.S. needs to adapt, “the true 
measure of success in Afghanistan, and one that is not uniformly evaluated, is the amount 
of ‘influence’ that the government holds over the population.”236 Knight advocates for 
gaining more influence for the Afghan government, supplanting that of the insurgents, 
especially with the local leaders. He supports the problems in the government not dealing 
with illicit products. He refers to the timber ban in the north as a point of contention for 
the local leaders, who will only support the government when a strong government 
presence combined with economic opportunities is materialized. 
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Colonel Spiszer advocates for more focus on building up the Afghan Security 
forces, all-inclusive, the troops, the leadership, the command and control and the 
relationship to the population for whom they will be left to protect.237 As Spiszer points 
out, the government must have the faith of the people in order to support the government 
security apparatus as one that will work on the population’s behalf. Spiszer also 
highlights four areas where gains were made; 1) separating the enemy from the 
population through careful planning, 2) developing the ANSF, 3) using funds to jump 
start the economy, facilitate security efforts, providing jobs and building infrastructure, 4) 
partnering and building government.238 
Colonel Veneri, while watching three Afghan Army cadet trainers attempt to 
pump up a basketball with a faulty pump, surmised, “we seem unaware that our resource-
intensive efforts may not work and Afghanistan might not make strategic sense in the 
end.”239 This is a good summation of the efforts from the initial invasion until this point. 
The greater the resources the U.S. and coalition partners pour into Afghanistan, the 
greater the resources the insurgency has to feed upon, again bringing the question of the 
strategic vision the Afghan mission has morphed into.  
Thomas Johnson and Chris Mason propose a radical approach to the difficult task 
of empowering the village elders in order to restore their historic place as the respected 
heads of families and clans, and the return of the traditional decision by consensus: 
To reverse its fortunes in Afghanistan, the U.S. needs to fundamentally 
reconfigure its operations, creating small development and security teams 
posted at new compounds in every district in the south and east of the 
country. This approach would not necessarily require adding troops, 
although that would help, 200 district-based teams of 100 people each 
would require 20,000 personnel, one-third of the 60,000 foreign troops 
currently in the country.240 
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Healthy, effective government-led security apparatus’ for all provinces are the 
only way to curb any possible revenue sources for the insurgency. Formation and growth 
of regional government administrative institutions and competent security forces will be 
necessary for the responsive control of regional resources, Afghanistan largest national 
asset. Incorporation of the tribes into ownership and stewardship of regional natural 
resources is also necessary to bolster the central government efforts. A U.S. government 
official backs up the need for comprehensive security by stating, “We know they are 
raising substantial amounts of money; they can finance their operations. If you take away 
the Gulf money, they can make it up. If you take away the narco money, they can make it 
up. It’s like punching jello.”241 Until the funding can be effectively interrupted, the 
efforts of the coalition will be exactly that; like punching jello, until the time comes for 
the U.S. and its coalition partners to step down.  
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